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Chapter 1
Introduction
BUDDHISM: “Hurt not others in ways that you
yourself would find harmful.”
CONFUCIANISM: “Surely it is a maxim of loving
kindness: Do not unto others what you would not
have them do unto you.”
TAOISM: “Regard your neighbor’s gain as your own
gain and your neighbor’s loss as your own loss.”
JUDAISM: “What is hateful to you, do not to your
fellow men. That is the entire Law; all the rest is
commentary.”
CHRISTIANITY: “All things whatsoever ye would
that men should do to you, do ye even so to them;
for this is the Law and the Prophets.”
ISLAM: “No one of you is a believer until he desires
for his brother that which he desires for himself.”
The Golden Rule1
What is the relationship between output, employment, and inflation? To
which extent and through which channels do economic policies affect these
aggregates? How does economic integration affect these aggregates and the
effectiveness of economic policies? These are some of the practically relevant
questions that have been forming the research agenda of many economists.
In this dissertation, I study a relatively small proportion of these questions.
To this end, I use the New Keynesian model extended to allow for the facts
that behavioral economics has assessed for price and wage formation. In
particular, I incorporate reciprocal altruistic behavior to the New Keynesian
model. The results I report in my dissertation suggest that this incorporation
may have profound and far-reaching implications.
1First Principles, Hausser (2006) pp. 356-418.
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In this introductory chapter, first I briefly lay out the underlying moti-
vations for (i)using the New Keynesian model as my general framework and
(ii)its behavioral extension. In the section after, I provide a brief description
of the microeconomic foundations of fair prices as the latter is relatively new
to macroeconomics. Because the fair wage model I use builds on the effi-
ciency wage theory, which has a long tradition in macroeconomics, it does
not require an extra clarification (in addition to that provided in relevant
chapters below).2 In the last section, I offer a short road map of the major
issues covered in my dissertation.
1.1 Behavioral Macroeconomics
Progress in macroeconomics over the past century has given rise to the dom-
inance of a specific model: the New Keynesian model. Main elements of the
New Keynesian model are explicit microeconomic foundations, general equi-
librium, monopolistic competition, and staggered price setting.3 The stan-
dard New Keynesian model can be represented by an IS curve, an LM curve,
and a Phillips curve, and, in this sense, is akin to its intellectual forefathers
from the (Old) Keynesian literature. But, because these IS-LM-Philips curve
relations are derived from utility/profit maximizing behavior of agents, and,
thus, have rigorous microeconomic foundations, the New Keynesian model is
also akin to the Real Business Cycle model.4
In the light of the findings of the New Keynesian literature, extending the
New Keynesian model in one way or the other seems necessary5. But why
behavioral economics?
In general, over the last three decades an increasing number of researchers
trying to explain economic phenomena has been departing from the standard
2For a textbook treatment of efficiency wages, see Chapter 9 of Blanchard and Fisher
(1989) and Chapter 10 of Romer (1996).
3King and Wolman (1996) and Yun (1996) are early prototypes of the standard New
Keynesian model. The book edited by Mankiw and Romer (1991), a two volume collection
of papers written in 1980’s, draws attention to the role of nominal and real rigidities,
and forms to a great extend the intellectual foundations of the New Keynesian model.
A similar collection emphasizing market imperfections is the book edited by Dixon and
Rankin (1995).
4See Cooley (1994) for a collection of important contributions to the Real Business
Cycle literature.
5Among many others, see, for example, Blanchard (2008), and Chari et al. (2008). See
also the introductory sections of Chapters 2 through 5 in this dissertation
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model of material payoff maximizing behavior towards models of behavior
that attribute richer roles to psychological or sociological mechanisms. This
departure is not a fad in the profession given the compelling evidence that hu-
man decisions are prone also to other factors that the standard models have
abstracted from. For example, my subjective synopsis can name: Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) on reference dependence; Akerlof (1982) on reciprocity
in industrial relations; Shiller (1984) on fads and fashions in stock markets;
Kahneman et al. (1986) on fairness considerations in monopoly pricing; Lux
(1995) on herding in financial markets; Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) on cooper-
ation and punishment in public goods.6
In particular, theories of reciprocal altruistic behavior and evidence from
experimental markets provide a good explanation of stickiness that we ob-
serve in price and wage data (Okun 1981, Akerlof 1982, Kahneman et al.
1986, Fehr et al. 1993, Rabin 1993, and Renner and Tyran 2004). The in-
tuitive explanation is as follows. For a stable relationship between the firm
and its customers (workers), the new price (wage) offer of the firm should be
justifiable with regard to the firm’s attitude towards its customers (workers).
For example, a higher price (lower wage) in response to a higher demand
(drop in sales) is not justifiable behavior because it does not indicate any
altruism. Hence, if the firm can show that it treats its costumers (workers)
well (by not fully exploiting the monopoly power/by offering a wage higher
than the market clearing wage), costumers (workers) in return continue to
buy the good (to supply high effort).
Two tractable models consistent with the behavioral argument of wage
and price stickiness are the fair price setting of Rotemberg (2005) and the
fair wage setting of Danthine and Kurmann (2004). To model the price ad-
justment mechanism, I use Rotemberg’s setting in Chapters 2, 3, and 6. To
model the wage adjustment mechanism, I use the setting of Danthine and
Kurmann in Chapters 3 through 6.
6No need to say, it is behind the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive list of
ideas and names of corresponding researchers in the area of behavioral economics. Thaler
(1994) is a collection of his Anomalies columns in Journal of Economic Perspectives, and
provides an extensive survey. A more abbreviated and compact survey is of Rabin (1998).
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1.2 Microeconomic Foundations of Fair Prices
What proceeds provides a brief layout of a one-period model, and the link
between the consumers fairness concerns and the probability of price adjust-
ment. Consequently, it serves as a basis to my discussion about nominal
rigidity in Chapters 2, 3, and 6. The material presented below is a brief
summary of Rotemberg’s (2005) analysis.
There is a unit mass of households. Each household produces its own
differentiated good. The felicity function of household j, is given by
wj = u(Cj)− v(φjyj), (1.1)
where yj denotes the output, φj denotes a variable indicating costs and Cj
is the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) aggregator. The function u(·) is concave and
increasing, and the function v(·) is convex and increasing. The aggregator is
defined as Cj ≡
[ ∫ 1
0
cj(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, θ > 1, where cj(z) is the consumption
of household j of good z, θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Expenditure
minimization by households implies that the corresponding price index is
given by
P =
[ ∫ 1
0
(P j)1−θdj
] 1
1−θ
, (1.2)
and the demand for household j’s product is given by
yj =
E
P
(P j
P
)−θ
, (1.3)
where E denotes the aggregate (nominal) expenditure. Further, household
j’s total expenditure, Ej, equals its revenue from sales:
PCj = Ej = P jyj. (1.4)
Consumers expect altruistic behavior from their sellers towards them. In
particular, consumers want seller i to set the price P i so as to maximize
wi +̟i
∫
j 6=i
wjt (1.5)
where 0 < ̟i < 1 is the parameter measuring the extend to which seller i is
altruistic towards its customers. Using equations (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4),
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in (1.5), we can express the altruistic maximization problem of a seller as
max
P i
u
(
P i
P
E
P
(P i
P
)−θ)
− v
(
φi
E
P
(P i
P
)−θ)
+
+̟i
∫
j 6=i
[
u
(
Ej
[ ∫ 1
0
(P i)1−θdi
] 1
θ−1
)
− v(φjyj)
]
.
The first order condition for this unconstrained maximization problem is
(1− θ)E
Pt
u′(Ci)
P
(P i∗
P
)−θ
+ θ
E
P
φiv′(φiyi)
P
(P i∗
P
)−θ−1
+
−̟i
∫
i6=j
Ej
P
u′(Cj)
P
(P i∗
P
)−θ
= 0,
where P i∗ is the price that maximizes (1.5). In a symmetric equilibrium, all
households have the same marginal utility of consumption, u′. Hence, the
first order condition can be arranged to get
P i∗
P
=
θ
θ +̟i − 1
v′
u′
φi. (1.6)
Notice that the term ( v
′
u′φ
i) is nothing but the real marginal cost of production
(cf. equation A 2.26 of Chapter 2). Two polar cases are worth to examine.
As ̟ → 0, the price approaches that implied under the standard monopo-
listic competition. More interestingly, as ̟ → 1, the price approaches that
implied under perfect competition.
Consumers do not know the true value of ̟i and φi, but they receive
random signals about the costs. Using these signals, they infer the value of
̟i. If they believe that ̟i is below some certain level, which implies firm i
is not altruistic enough (the price is not fair), they stop buying. Rotemberg
further provides the analysis of consumers’ willingness to harm the firm that
does not act altruistically. A direct effect of such a desire is a sharp fall in
demand (boycotts), i.e., a large kink in the demand curve at a certain price
level. For this reason, firms keep their prices below this price level, which, in
turn induces price rigidity.
The inverse relationship between the relative price of firm i and the ̟i
is apparent from equation (1.6). In a dynamic setting, a second plausible
variable that can affect the consumers’ inferences about ̟i is the level of
inflation in the last period. It is plausible to assume that a price increase
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is easier to pronounce by a firm because inflation can be blamed for the
increase in costs. Such a statement of the firm does not need to be true,
because consumers have imperfect information about firm’s costs. Formally:
the probability density function from which signals about costs are drawn
governs also the probability that a firm keeps its price constant. Rotemberg
suggest that an increase in inflation shifts the distribution such that drawing
a positive inference about firm’s altruism becomes more likely, which, in turn,
implies that the probability that a firm keeps its price constant decreases.
Denoting the letter probability by γt and inflation by πt, the probability of
price adjustment can be described, up to a log-linear approximation, by
log γt = ωrp log rpt + ωπ log πt−1, (1.7)
where ωrp > 0, ωπ < 0, rpt ≡ P i∗t /Pt. Equation 1.7 shall turn out to be
key equation in my analyses featuring fair prices. For this reason, I provide
further clarification of this equation in the next two chapters.
1.3 An Overview of the Dissertation
The analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 are based on closed economy models. In
these two chapters, I attempt to provide explanations for the persistent ef-
fects of monetary policy shocks on output and inflation, and the dynamic
relationship between the latter two.
In Chapter 2, I study an economy where a contractionary (expansionary)
monetary policy shock gives rise to a more (less) frequent price adjustment.
To this end, I develop a model that allows for supply side effects of nominal
shocks, and extend the price adjustment mechanism of Rotemberg (2005) ac-
cordingly. I then analyze the implications of the extended price adjustment
mechanism for the dynamics of output and inflation in the aftermath of a
monetary policy shock.
In Chapter 3, I explore the joint implications of fair prices and fair wages.
The general framework that I use is based on Christiano et al. (2005). First,
I analyze the comovements of employment, wages, and inflation with output,
with a focus on the lead-lag relation between inflation and output. I then
study the propagation of monetary policy shocks.
The analyses in Chapters 4 through 6 primarily concern issues related to
international economics. As a general framework, I use a two-country model
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in the tradition of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). There are, however, significant
differences between the models as regards their details, e.g., assumptions re-
garding preferences, the production technology, international price settings,
the structure of shocks, just to name a few.
In Chapters 4 and 5, I analyze the impact of an increase in international
trade in financial assets on labor market volatility and on the effectiveness of
fiscal policy, respectively. Unfortunately, notwithstanding numerous efforts,
the impact of financial market integration is a highly controversial matter,
and the matter remains essentially unclear. Therefore, my study in these two
chapters is an offer of an alternative framework for thinking on these issues.
In Chapter 6, I again focus on the joint implications of fair prices and
fair wages, but this time allowing for the real exchange rate movements and
international propagation of shocks. I analyze the dynamic effects of mon-
etary policy and technology shocks under different assumptions for market
imperfections and completeness. My results with regard to market complete-
ness contradict the findings of previous research, and therefore, suggest to
reconsidering the claims of the relevant former studies.
In the last chapter, I offer some concluding remarks and my outlook on
future research. All chapters are to a certain extent self contained (for the
price of repeating myself a bit), and does not require to be read in certain
order. To obtain a contrast of closed and open economy implications of fair
prices and fair wages, Chapters 3 and 6 can be read in a row, but this not
necessary as I provide a brief comparison in Chapter 6. I hope that the reader
will gain some new insights.
Chapter 2
A New Cost Channel of
Monetary Policy
Understanding the dynamics of output and inflation in the aftermath of a
monetary policy shock is a key issue in macroeconomic research. Developing
a deeper understanding of this issue requires a detailed analysis of the link
between inflation and price adjustment by firms. The analysis of this link
calls for a careful study of why firms adjust prices sluggishly.
Rigorous attempts to explain the sluggishness of prices are the theories of
(i) imperfect information (Phelps 1970, Lucas 1972, Mankiw and Reis 2002),
(ii) costly price adjustment and menu costs (Rotemberg 1982, Mankiw 1985,
Akerlof and Yellen 1985), and (iii) costly information (Ball and Mankiw
1994). The theories developed by Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982), and
Calvo (1983) have been widely applied in recent research as devices for mod-
eling sticky prices in dynamic, general equilibrium frameworks.
These widely used theories of sluggish price adjustment cannot explain
two stylized facts that have been documented by empirical researchers. First,
Fabiani et al. (2006) report that implicit contracts between firms and their
customers appear to be the main explanation of price stickiness in the euro
area. Menu costs and costly information are found to be of minor importance.
Implicit contracts imply that firms and their customers have long-term rela-
tions, and in order not to antagonize their customers firms reset prices only
after cost shocks, but not after demand shocks.1
Second, the theories of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982), and Calvo
1For studies yielding similar results, see Blinder et al. (1998) for the US, Hall et al.
(2000) for the UK, Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada, and Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden.
9(1983) imply a time-dependent pricing policy which, in turn, implies that
the frequency of price adjustment is constant. Apel et al. (2005) and Fabi-
ani et al. (2006), however, report that macroeconomic conditions affect the
frequency of price adjustment. The view that the frequency of price adjust-
ment should be taken as endogenous has also been suggested by Konieczny
and Skrzypacz (2006) who report evidence that the intensity of consumer
search for the best price affects the frequency of price adjustment.
In order to account for these two stylized facts, I analyze the effects of
monetary policy on output and inflation in an extension of a model devel-
oped by Rotemberg (2005). Rotemberg’s model is based upon behavioral
economics, and it captures the connotations of both implicit contract theory
and a variable frequency of price adjustment. Another appealing feature of
Rotemberg’s model is that it generalizes to positive long-run trend inflation.2
Rotemberg (2005) assumes that price increases are viewed by costumers
as fair and justifiable only if these increases are triggered by cost increases.
Otherwise customers get upset, and the relationship between the firm and its
customers breaks down. Consumers have imperfect information about the
cost of firms, and they receive random signals about costs. In Rotemberg’s
model, relative prices and inflation are signals about the fairness of price
increases, and, in particular, inflation is a signal of cost increases. For this
reason, the probability that firms can reset their price is a function of relative
and general price level increases.
The main motivation for my extension of Rotemberg’s model stems from
the recent studies on the so-called cost channel of monetary policy transmis-
sion (See, for example, Barth and Ramey 2001, Ravenna and Walsh 2006,
Chowdhury et al. 2006, and Gaiotti and Secchi 2006). These studies present
empirical evidence on the presence of the cost channel. The cost channel
implies that, apart from affecting the demand side of the economy, monetary
policy shocks affect also the supply side because they affect firms’ cost of
financing working capital.
Building on the research on the cost channel of monetary policy, I as-
sume that consumers perceive contractionary monetary changes as cost in-
creases. Because consumers have imperfect information about the cost of
firms, the interest rate is an easily-available, easy-to-monitor signal of cost-
2Trend inflation is confirmed by economic data, and has important implications for
macroeconomic dynamics. See, for example, Ball et al. (1988), Ascari (2004), and Cogley
and Sbordone (2006) for implications of trend inflation in New Keynesian frameworks.
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push shocks. Moreover, the interest rate contains important information
about the overall state of the economy, which, in turn, is important because,
as suggested by Rotemberg (2005), “the frequency of price adjustment can
depend on economy-wide variables observed by consumers”. Because the cost
channel of monetary policy I develop in this chapter differs from the tradi-
tional cost channel discussed in the earlier literature, I will henceforth call
it the new cost channel. I will use the term the working capital cost channel
when I refer to the traditional cost channel.
Using a small-scale, dynamic general equilibrium model, I show that the
new cost channel has substantial implications for the propagation of mone-
tary policy shocks. The responses of inflation and output to monetary policy
shocks are more realistic in the model with the new cost channel than in
the model without it. The response of inflation in my model is delayed and
persistent. My model also implies a significant increase in the persistence of
the effect of monetary policy shocks on output. Further, my model implies
an increase in the persistence of the response of the nominal interest rate.
I organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. In Section 2.1, I lay
out the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model I used to derive my
results. In Section 2.2, I report the results of numerical simulations. In
Section 2.3, I report the results of the sensitivity analysis. In section 2.4, I
conclude.
2.1 The Model Economy
The economy operates in discrete time, and monetary policy is the only
source of uncertainty. The economy consists of households, firms, a financial
intermediary, and a monetary authority. The numbers of households and
firms are assumed to be large. For tractability, I assume a continuum of
households, indexed by j, and firms, indexed by z, with j, z ∈ [0, 1].
2.1.1 Households
The expected present value of lifetime utility of a representative household j
is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(Cjt )
1−σ−1 − 1
1− σ−1 −
(N jt )
1+φ
1 + φ
]
, (2.1)
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with
Cjt ≡
[∫ 1
0
cjt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, (2.2)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, 0 < σ−1 is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion (or, equivalently, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion), 0 < φ is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to
real wages, and 1 < θ is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated
goods. Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on period t
information, N jt is the quantity of labor supplied by household j, and c
j
t(z)
denotes household j’s consumption of good z. Using the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
aggregator given in (2.2), I derived the corresponding price index, Pt, defined
as the price of one unit of the composite consumption good, Ct:
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
. (2.3)
The demand of household j for good z is given by
cjt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Cjt , (2.4)
where Pt(z) is the price of good z.
In order to maximize its utility function given in (2.1), the household j
chooses Cjt , N
j
t , and the amount of nominal riskless one-period bonds B
j
t to
carry over to the next period. The period-t budget constraint is given by
R−1t B
j
t
Pt
+ Cjt ≤
Bjt−1
Pt
+
WtN
j
t
Pt
+ Φjt , (2.5)
where Rt is the gross nominal returns on bond holdings, Wt is the nominal
wage rate determined in a competitive labor market, and Φjt is the sum of
the household’s real profit income received from the financial intermediary
and firms. Each household holds the same amount of shares of the financial
intermediary and the same amount of shares of each firm.
The optimality conditions for the household’s maximization problem are
given by
(Cjt )
−σ−1 = λt, (2.6)
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(N jt )
φ
(Cjt )
−σ−1 =
Wt
Pt
, (2.7)
λt
RtPt
= βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
, (2.8)
a transversality condition, and the binding version of the budget constraint
given in (2.5). For future convenience, let Λt,t+i denote a stochastic discount
factor for nominal payoffs between periods t and t+ i. Then, using equations
(2.6) and (2.8), I obtain
Λt,t+i ≡ βi
(
Cjt+i
Cjt
)−σ−1
Pt
Pt+i
. (2.9)
2.1.2 Firms
Each firm operates in a monopolistically competitive goods market. The
demand curve is given by
yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Ct, (2.10)
where yt(z) is the good produced by firm z and Ct ≡
∫ 1
0
Cjt dj is total con-
sumption.
The production function is given by
yt(z) = Nt(z), (2.11)
where Nt(z) is the labor input of firm z.
To model the working capital cost channel, I assume that the workers are
paid before production takes place. Therefore, at the beginning of period t,
each firm has to borrow an amount of WtNt(z) from the financial interme-
diary to finance its wage bill, and at the end of the period this amount has
to be paid back with an interest of Rt− 1. Given the production function in
(2.11), and the cost structure of the firm, cost minimization requires
mct = Rtwt, (2.12)
where mct is the real marginal cost of production and wt ≡ Wt/Pt.
To model price stickiness, I use the price setting mechanism developed
by Rotemberg (2005). The distinguishing feature of the setting suggested
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by Rotemberg is that the probability that a firm can reset its price is an
endogenous variable rather than an exogenous constant. Firms can change
the price in every period with probability 0 < 1− γt < 1. The maximization
problem of a typical firm can be expressed as
max
Pt(z)
Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+iyt+i(z) [Pt(z)− Pt+imct+i(z)] , (2.13)
subject to
yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Ct,
where the variable Γt,t+i denotes the probability that the firm cannot change
the price between the periods t and t + i and defined as Γt,t+i ≡
∏i
l=1 γt+l,
with Γt,t ≡ 1. Firms set the price so as to maximize the expected present
discounted value of profits. Using the demand curve to substitute out yt(z)
in (2.13) and maximizing it over Pt(z) gives
Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+iyt+i(z)
[
P ∗t (z)−
θ
θ − 1Pt+imct+i
]
= 0, (2.14)
where P ∗t (z) is the optimal price. Equation (2.14) implies that if the firm can
change its price in every period, then the optimal price of good z is simply
a mark-up over marginal costs. But because the firm cannot set the price
in every period, it takes into account also average future expected marginal
revenues and average future expected marginal costs. These are the stan-
dard logical implications of staggered price adjustment mechanisms. Here,
however, unlike time-dependent price-adjustment settings, the probability of
price adjustment in the averaging factor depends on the state of the econ-
omy.3 A detailed explanation of the link between the probability of price
adjustment of a firm and the state of the economy shall be presented in the
next subsection.
Using (2.14), the optimal relative price, rpt ≡ P ∗t (z)/Pt, can be expressed
as
rpt =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
1+θ Ct+imct+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
θ Ct+i
. (2.15)
3Setting the probability of price adjustment, γt, constant reduces the price setting
mechanism to that of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).
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Because I assume symmetry across firms, implying that the firms that can
reset their prices choose the same new price, I denote the relative price by
rpt rather than by rpt(z). The price index (2.3), therefore, can be written as
γt(πt)
θ−1 + (1− γt)(rpt)1−θ = 1, (2.16)
where πt denotes the gross inflation rate.
2.1.3 The Frequency of Price Adjustment
Because the assumption of a variable frequency of price adjustment is one of
the key features of the model in this chapter, it deserves special attention.
As is widely known, models employing the price setting mechanism of Calvo
(1983) assume that in any period of time a constant fraction of randomly
selected firms cannot change their prices. This implies a constant time path
for the frequency of price adjustment. But studies, e.g. by Konieczny and
Skrzypacz (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), show that there is a
high correlation between the frequency of price changes and inflation. Thus,
in a plausible general equilibrium model, a shock that affects inflation should
also affect the frequency of price adjustment. Moreover, the Calvo mechanism
gives rise to counterfactual results in the presence of positive trend inflation
(Bakhshi et al. 2007).4 The recent study of Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2006)
provides empirical evidence that contradicts the constant frequency of price
adjustment. Also, the findings of Apel et al. (2005) and Fabiani et al. (2006)
suggest that the frequency of price adjustment is affected by macroeconomic
conditions.
By building on the theory of implicit contracts, Rotemberg (2005) gen-
eralizes Calvo’s (1983) model to incorporate a variable and endogenous fre-
quency of price adjustment. The theory of implicit contracts implies that
firms are reluctant to change prices because they have some sort of long
term relationships with their customers, who do not like price increases. Af-
ter an increase of the price of a firm, the relationship of the firm with its
customers breaks down unless the customers believe that the increase in the
price was triggered by cost increases, and, thus, fair.
Following Rotemberg (2005), I assume that the relative price, rpt, and
the inflation rate in the last period, πt−1, are signals about the perceived
4To remedy the shortcomings of the Calvo setting, Romer (1990) develops a model
where firms facing cost of price adjustment optimally choose the frequency of price ad-
justment.
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fairness of price increases, and, in particular, πt−1 is a signal of cost in-
creases. Because, ceteris paribus, an increase in the relative price will imply
that the absolute price is increased more relative to other prices, rpt is a
‘negative’ signal of fairness. Because inflation implies an overall increase in
costs, πt−1 is a ‘positive’ signal of fairness. In addition to rpt and πt−1, which
are the variables affecting the frequency of price adjustment in Rotemberg
(2005), I assume that the nominal interest rate, Rt, is also such a signal
because consumers perceive nominal interest changes as cost changes. This
assumption can be justified by considering that an increase in the nominal
interest rate negatively affects the firm’s cost of financing working capital.
Because of this cost-push effect, the increase in the nominal interest rate can
be pointed to consumers as an increase in costs, i.e., Rt is a ’positive’ signal
of fairness.5 Recent findings of Choudhary et al. (2007) also support my
extension of Rotemberg’s model. Choudhary et al. report that when faced
with a temporary or expected rise in demand, around 85 % of price setters
would leave their prices unchanged. When faced with an increase in the in-
terest rate, however, about 42% of the price setters would increase the prices.
Moreover, as a signal of changes in costs, the nominal interest rate is
easily available and easy to monitor. Consequently, as the nominal interest
rate contains important information about the overall state of the economy,
the nominal interest rate act as a proxy for cost-change-signaling variables
that are absent in the model.
Accordingly, firms adjust their prices only when they believe that the
price increase will not bring about a customer resistance, i.e., a sharp fall in
demand.6 Thus, the random signals that govern the fairness evaluation of a
price increase also govern the probability of the price adjustment:
log γt = ωrp log rpt + ωπ log πt−1 + ωR logRt. (2.17)
As regards the signs of the parameters, ωrp is positive because, ceteris paribus,
5A counter argument to this justification can be as follows. An increase in the nominal
interest rate is a signal of tighter monetary policy, and thus will lead to a decrease in
inflation. For this reason consumers may perceive price increases after an increase in
the nominal interest rate as unfair. I have also simulated a model in which an increase
in the nominal interest rate gives rise to a less frequent price adjustment. As results of
that simulation (not presented) have been counterfactual, my assumption that consumers
perceive nominal interest changes as cost changes appears empirically more plausible than
the counter argument above.
6Price decreases, on the other hand, are excluded from the analysis by assuming that
the steady state level of inflation is sufficiently large which, in turn, makes the price
decreases nonoptimal.
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if the increase in the price of good z is higher than the increase in the con-
sumer price index, then customer of firm z can perceive this unfair, and thus
the reset probability 1 − γt decreases. Because higher inflation will imply
higher costs, and because price increases triggered by cost increases are per-
ceived fair, ωπ is negative, and thus the reset probability 1− γt increases in
inflation.7 Finally, the parameter ωR is negative because of the cost-push
effect of nominal interest rate increases.
2.1.4 The Financial Intermediary and The Monetary
Authority
The financial intermediary operates costlessly, borrows an amount of Mt
from the monetary authority at the rate Rt − 1, and lends the amount
Wt
∫ 1
0
Nt(z)dz to the firms at the rate Rt− 1. This implies that the profit of
the financial intermediary is zero. I assume the monetary authority transfers
its interest income Wt
∫ 1
0
Nt(z)dz(Rt−1) to the financial intermediary which
in turn distributes it to its shareholders.
In order to close the model, I assume that the monetary authority con-
ducts its policy according to a reaction function given by
logRt = ρ0 + ρπ log πt + ρL logRt−1 + εRt , (2.18)
where ρ0 is a constant, and ε
R
t is an unanticipated shock to monetary policy.
The latter is also assumed to be white-noise.
2.1.5 Aggregation
Because I study a symmetric equilibrium, I can drop the indices of j’s and
z’s from all equations but equation (2.10). The reason for excluding equation
(2.10) is that the so-called inefficient price dispersion. To view this issue,
integrate both sides of the equation (2.10) over z. The result is the resource
constraint
Yt = stCt, (2.19)
where Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(z)dz, and st ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
dz. Because, by Jensen’s in-
equality, st is bounded below by 1, aggregate production may differ from
7The idea of that the reset probability increases in inflation is emphasized also in
Bakhshi et al. (2007).
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aggregate consumption (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2004). Thus the price
dispersion generated by the assumed price setting mechanism is a costly dis-
tortion. Applying the same reasoning used to derive equation (2.16), st can
be expressed as
st = (1− γt)rp−θt + γtπθt st−1. (2.20)
Market clearing conditions for bonds, labor, and loans markets are given
by∫ 1
0
Bjtdj = 0,
∫ 1
0
Nt(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
N jt dj, and Mt = WtNt.
2.1.6 Calibration and Solution of the Model
I log-linearized the equations of the model, and then solved and simulated the
calibrated model using the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCal-
lum (2001).8 To log-linearize, I chose a positive level of steady-state inflation
so that the variations in the frequency of price adjustment have an effect on
the propagations of shocks. To see this point, note that the coefficient of γt
in the log-linearized version of equation (2.15) and that of equation (2.16)
are, respectively, γβπθ − γβπθ−1 and π1−θ−1
(1−γ)(θ−1) .
9 Thus setting inflation to
zero, i.e., π = 1, reduces these coefficients to zero.
I calibrate the parameters of my model as summarized in Table 2.1. The
calibration of the parameters characterizing preferences is based on Ravenna
and Walsh (2006), and is standard in the literature.10 Setting one period to
equal a quarter of a year, I set the discount factor β = 1.041−1/4 so that the
annual rate of interest is 4.1%. I set σ−1 = 1.5 implying a higher risk aversion
than logarithmic utility. I set the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, φ, to
1. I set θ = 11, implying a markup rate of 10%.
8In the appendix to this chapter, I present a detailed derivation of several equations
of the model, the solution for the steady state, and the log-linearization of equilibrium
conditions.
9For notational convenience, I drop the time index of a variable to denote its steady
state value.
10In order to visualize the effects of varying parameter values, I shall conduct sensitivity
analysis in the next section.
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Parameters
Preferences
Discount factor: β = 1.041−1/4
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution: σ = 2/3
Labor supply elasticity φ−1 = 1
Demand elasticity: θ = 11
Inflation, Price Rigidity and Frequency of Price Adjustments
Steady-state value of reset probability: 1− γ = 0.25
Steady-state value of gross inflation: π = 1.051/4
Elasticity of γt w.r.t.
a)optimal relative price: ωrp = 2.5
b)past inflation: ωπ = −15
c)nominal interest rate ωR = −10
Monetary Policy
Interest Rate Smoothing ρL = 0.9
Reaction to Inflation ρπ = 0.9
The parameters characterizing the price adjustment mechanism are cal-
ibrated following Rotemberg (2005). I set π equal to 1.051/4, so that the
annual inflation is 5%, and rp equal to 1.05. When steady state inflation
is zero, steady state values of rpt and st are equal to 1 irrespective of the
steady state value of γt. Given the values of θ, π and rp, equation (2.16)
implies γ = 0.75 which, in turn, indicates that, on average, firms adjust their
prices once a year. I set ωrp = 2.5 and ωπ = −15. I set the parameter ωR,
governing the effect of the new cost channel, equal to −10.
For the parameter values of the monetary authority’s reaction function,
I set ρπ = 0.9 and ρL = 0.9. These two values are also based on Rotemberg
(2005).
2.2 Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
2.2.1 A Comparison of Four Alternative Models
Before analyzing the effects of monetary policy shocks in my model, it will
be convenient to highlight per se implications of the working capital cost
channel and the variable frequency of price adjustment for the propagation
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of monetary policy shocks. To this end, I consider four distinct versions of
my model. The first one is a standard New Keynesian model, the structure
of which is equivalent to that of the baseline model, except that it features
Calvo (1983) type price staggering and no working capital cost channel. The
second one extends the first one to allow for the working capital cost chan-
nel. The third one replaces Calvo-type price staggering in the first one with
Rotemberg’s (2005) pricing. And the fourth one extends the third one to
allow for the working capital cost channel. Note that in the last two models,
I considered the pure Rotemberg setting, and thus, abstracted from the new
cost channel, the implications of which I shall present in Subsection 2.2.2.
All four models considered feature trend inflation.
Figure 2.1: A Contractionary Monetary Shock in Four Alternative Models
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Note: The horizontal axis measures quarters. The vertical axis measures logarith-
mic/percentage deviations from the steady state. Model 1: New Keynesian Model with
Calvo pricing. Model 2: Model 1 allowing for the working capital cost channel. Model 3:
Model 1 with Rotemberg pricing. Model 4: Model 3 allowing for the working capital cost
channel.
Figure 2.1 presents the impulse response functions for the four distinct
models. The impulse response functions describe the dynamics of four vari-
ables −output, inflation, γt, and the nominal interest rate− in the aftermath
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of a one percentage point positive shock to the nominal interest rate. Com-
paring the impulse response functions for Models 1 and 3 to those for Models
2 and 4 highlights the role played by the working capital cost channel on the
dynamics of inflation and output in the aftermath of contractionary mone-
tary policy shock. The impulse response functions illustrate the result that
the working capital cost channel does not significantly affect the responses of
output, inflation, γt, and nominal interest rate. Furthermore, this result ob-
tains irrespective of Calvo or Rotemberg type price setting mechanism. For
example, the absolute difference in the initial output responses in the first
two models −featuring Calvo pricing− is 8.20 basis points, whereas the cor-
responding statistic in the latter two models −featuring Rotemberg pricing−
is 8.58 basis points. Thus, the working capital cost channel alone does not
play a critical role for the dynamics of output and inflation, a result also
emphasized by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).
As regards the role of the variable frequency of price adjustment for the
propagation of monetary policy shocks, my results are qualitatively similar to
those reported in Rotemberg (2005). Comparing the impulse response func-
tions for Models 1 and 2 to those for Models 3 and 4 shows that Rotemberg-
type pricing produces a delayed response of inflation as shown in the data
(Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999). Since in the models with Rotem-
berg pricing, the impact effect of a shock on inflation is less than those in
the models with Calvo pricing, the impact effect on output is larger in the
models with Rotemberg pricing.
2.2.2 Implications of the New Cost Channel
Figure 2.2 depicts impulse response functions for the baseline model and for
Rotemberg’s (2005) model. Note that the difference between the baseline
model and Rotemberg model is that the former extents the latter by intro-
ducing the new cost channel. As can be seen from Figure 2.2, this extension
significantly alters the dynamics of model variables.
The response of inflation generated by the baseline model (solid line)
is more delayed than the response of inflation generated by the Rotemberg
model (dashed line). Measuring the persistence of responses, for example, by
half-life, we can observe that the inflation response is more persistent in the
baseline model. The baseline model generates also less volatile inflation. The
reason for this is that allowing for the new cost channel causes a significant
downward shift in the response of γt. This arises because the coefficient of γt
in the linearized version of equation (2.16) is always negative due to π > 1
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and θ > 1. Even though the response of optimal relative price also shifts
downwards in my model (not shown in Figure 2.2), the decrease in optimal
relative price falls short of the decrease in γt. A larger response of γt, in
turn, implies a muted response of inflation. The intuitive reason for this is
that, recall, in the baseline model an increase in the nominal interest rate is
a signal of a cost push shock. This induces more frequent price adjustment.
The increase in the frequency of price adjustment (drop in γt) dampens the
disinflationary effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock. In short,
the stronger the (negative) response of γt the weaker the (negative) response
of inflation. The muted response of inflation, in turn, gives rise to a higher
increase in the real interest rate through two channels. The first channel is
the well known Fisher condition: rt = Rt/Etπt+1, where rt denotes the real
interest rate. The second channel is the reaction function of the monetary
authority, logRt = 0.9 log πt + 0.9 logRt−1. Thus, the reduced and stretched
inflation response increases the response of the real interest rate directly
through the Fisher condition and indirectly through the reaction function of
the monetary authority. This indirect effect explains in part the magnified
responses of γt.
Figure 2.2: Rotemberg v.s. New Cost Channel
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Note: Solid (dashed) lines show responses in the baseline (Rotemberg) model.
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The increased response of real interest rate implies a more persistent con-
sumption and output effects. The difference between the responses of output
and consumption stems from price dispersion, and comparing the consump-
tion and output responses for the two models highlights that accounting for
price dispersion has nontrivial consequences only in the extended model. The
assumption of the new cost channel implies a significant increase in the re-
sponse of output with respect to that of consumption due to the increase in
the response of the price dispersion.
To illustrate further the implications of the assumption of the new cost
channel, I assumed γR = −13 and θ = 15, and simulated the effects of a
monetary tightening for this particular case as well as for the benchmark
case. Figure 2.3 depicts the impulse response functions for both this specific
calibration (solid line) and the benchmark calibration, γR = −10, θ = 11,
(dashed line). Note that setting θ = 15 implies a more competitive goods
market and a steady state level of 0.7266 for γt. A more competitive goods
market and a greater γR (in absolute value) shift the response of output
downwards, and generate a hump-shaped output response. As regards in-
flation, its response is reduced, and the delay of the peak of the inflation
response is now six quarters, whereas for the benchmark calibration it is
four quarters. By switching from the benchmark calibration to the new one,
neither the consumption response nor the nominal interest rate response are
altered significantly.
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Figure 2.3: Responses under Alternative Parameterizations of ωR and θ
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In sum, my results suggest that the new cost channel can generate out-
put and inflation responses to monetary policy shocks that closely resemble
those found in vector autoregressive (VAR) studies assessing the effects of
monetary policy shocks (See, for example, Leeper et al. 1996, Bernanke and
Mihov 1998, Rotemberg and Woodford 1998, and Christiano et al. 1999).
2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
I now analyze the sensitivity of my results to various changes in the calibra-
tion of the parameters π, ωrp, ωπ, ωR, σ, φ and θ. Note that any variation
in the steady-state of inflation implies a variation in the steady-state of γt.
Thus, by analyzing the sensitivity of my results with respect to the steady
state inflation, I implicitly analyze the sensitivity of my results with respect
to the degree of price stickiness as well. Table 2.2 summarizes the set of
intervals of these parameters for which I conduct the sensitivity analysis.
Table 2.2: Range of Parameters Varying
Parameter Range
Steady state inflation π 1.051/4 : 1.501/4
Elasticity of γt w.r.t.
optimal relative price ωrp 0 : 3
lagged inflation ωπ −25 : 0
nominal interest rate ωR −20 : 0
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ 0.5 : 2
Inverse of labor supply elasticity φ 0 : 2
Demand elasticity θ 5 : 25
In order to summarize the results of the sensitivity analysis, I use three
dimensional graphs. The graphs illustrate how the variation in a parameter
alters the impulse response functions. The alternative values of the parame-
ter in question are shown on the northwest-southeast axis of the graphs.
Figure 2.4 displays the responses of output and inflation for
π ∈ [1.051/4, 1.501/4] (first row), ωrp ∈ [0, 3] (second row), ωπ ∈ [−25, 0]
(third row), and ωR ∈ [−20, 0] (last row). Given rp = 1.05 and θ = 11,
a 5% annual inflation implies γ = 0.7485, whereas a 50% annual inflation
implies γ = 0.1803. The graphs in the first row shows that the response of
inflation shifts downwards with the increase in π, which, in turn, decreases
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the persistence of the output response. This implies that the Phillips-curve
gets steeper with the increase in steady-state inflation. Moreover, the delay
of the peak of the inflation response decreases from 4 quarters to 1 quarter
when annual inflation increases from 5% to 50%. In other words, the delay is
4 quarters when prices are, on average, reset every 4 quarters, and the delay
is 1 quarter when prices are, on average, reset every quarter. The second
row of graphs shows that the increase in ωrp brings about a stronger output
response and a more muted inflation response. The third row of graphs shows
that the results are robust to the choice of ωπ, and illustrates that ωπ > 0 is
necessary for a delayed peak in inflation response. The graphs in the last row
confirm the results of Subsection 2.2.2. As the response of inflation magnifies,
the persistence of the output response decreases with the decrease in ωR.
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity analysis for alternative values of π, ωrp, ωπ, and ωR
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Figure 2.5: Sensitivity analysis for alternative values of values of σ, φ and θ
Figure 2.5 presents results of the sensitivity analysis with regard to the
preference parameters. Variations in the parameters do not alter the pat-
terns of the responses significantly except for those expected. For example,
the volatility of output increases with the decrease in the coefficient of relative
risk aversion, σ−1 as shown by the graphs in the first row. The reason is that
when households become less risk averse, they require also less consumption
smoothing, which, in turn, translates itself to high volatility of output. The
second row of graphs shows that increasing the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity dampens (magnifies) the output (inflation) response. This occurs
because a decrease in the labor supply elasticity induces less sensitive house-
holds to wage changes. Thus, for a given level of output, firms has to pay
higher wages which translates itself to higher inflation. In other words, the
Phillips-curve becomes steeper. The graphs in the last row replicates the
result of of the previous section; a more competitive goods market increases
the output response because of the increase in the response of the price dis-
persion. A change in the competitiveness of the goods market induced by the
variation in the elasticity of substitution, θ, does not affect the response of
consumption (not shown in Figure 2.5). Thus, the results reported in Section
2.2 are robust with respect to the calibration of preferences as well.
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2.4 Conclusions
I incorporated the cost channel of monetary policy, the variable frequency
of price adjustment, and trend inflation into a small scale, dynamic, gen-
eral equilibrium model. First, I found that allowing for the working capital
cost channel alone does not significantly alter output and inflation effects of
monetary policy shocks, as has also been emphasized by Christiano et al.
(2005). Second, I showed that assuming the new cost channel, which im-
plies that the frequency of price adjustment increases in the nominal interest
rate, can account both for the persistence of the output response and for
the muted and delayed inflation response to monetary policy shocks found in
several VAR studies (e.g., Leeper et al. 1996 and Bernanke and Mihov 1998).
The reason for this striking result is that in my model, a contractionary
(expansionary) nominal shock gives rise to a more (less) frequent price ad-
justment, which, in turn, dampens the disinflationary (inflationary) effect a
nominal shock, and, thus, magnifies the output effect. Therefore, it would be
interesting, in the tradition of Ball (1994 and 1995), to see the implications
of the new cost channel for announced and/or permanent policy changes.
My theoretical analysis should also stimulate empirical research. Despite
well-documented evidences of the working capital cost channel and implicit
contracts, the relevance of their combination, the new cost channel, requires
micro- and macro-evidences, which, in turn calls for econometric, experimen-
tal, or survey-type studies.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix contains derivations of the expressions and results that are
reported in the main text but require some further explanations to obtain.
After presenting the equilibrium conditions of my model in their non-linear
form, I solve for the steady states of the stationary variables. Note that be-
cause of the assumed trend inflation, all the nominal variables, except for the
nominal interest rate, are nonstationary. Hence, prior to solving, I normalize
the nominal variables to make the problem stationary. Then, I log-linearize
the equilibrium conditions around a steady state with trend inflation.
A 2.1 Solving for the Dynamics in the Baseline Model
The consumption index Cjt is a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggregator:
Cjt ≡
[∫ 1
0
cjt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
. (A 2.1)
Given the price charged by firm z for its product, Pt(z), corresponding
consumption-based money price index (or the consumer price index), Pt, de-
fines the minimum cost of a unit of the aggregate defined by (A 2.1). Thus,
I can define the expenditure minimization problem of a consumer by
min
ct(z)j
∫ 1
0
Pt(z)c
j
t(z)dz subject to C
j
t = 1.
The first order condition to this problem is
Pt(z) = νt(c
j
t(z))
−1/θ(Cjt )
−1/θ, (A 2.2)
where νt is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Multiplying both sides
of (A 2.2) by ct(z), integrating over z, and using the definition of C
j
t given
by (A 2.1) imply∫ 1
0
Pt(z)c
j
t(z)dz = νt
[∫ 1
0
cjt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
. (A 2.3)
Note that total expenditure of household j should be equal to the value of
aggregate consumption of household j, i.e.,
∫ 1
0
Pt(z)c
j
t(z)dz = PtC
j
t . This
condition together with (A 2.3) implies
Pt = νt. (A 2.4)
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Substituting (A 2.4) into (A 2.2) gives the demand schedule of household j
for product z:
cjt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Cjt . (A 2.5)
Integrate (A 2.5) over j, to get the demand curve that firm z faces:
yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Ct, (A 2.6)
where yt(z) ≡
∫ 1
0
cjt(z)dj and Ct ≡
∫ 1
0
Cjt dj. Integrating (A 2.6) over z gives
the resource constraint:
Yt = stCt, (A 2.7)
where Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(z)dz, and
stP
−θ
t ≡
∫ 1
0
(Pt(z))
−θ dz. (A 2.8)
Finally, using (A 2.4) and (A 2.5) in (A 2.2) gives the consumer price index:
P 1−θt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−θdz
]
. (A 2.9)
The assumed price adjustment setting in the model implies that in period t
a fraction of 1− γt of firms can adjust prices. Thus, letting P ∗t (z) denote the
adjusted price, (A 2.9) can be expressed as
P 1−θt = (1− γt)P ∗t (z)1−θ +
+γt
(
(1− γt−1)P ∗t−1(z)1−θ + γt−1
(
(1− γt−2)P ∗t−2(z)1−θ + . . .
))
= (1− γt)P ∗t (z)1−θ + γtP 1−θt−1 .
Dividing this expression through by Pt, I obtain
1 = γtπ
θ−1
t−1 + (1− γt)rp1−θt . (A 2.10)
Applying the same logic used in steps from (A 2.9) to (A 2.10) to (A 2.8), I
can write
stP
−θ
t = (1− γt)Pt(z)−θ+
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+γt
(
(1− γt−1)Pt−1(z)−θ + γt−1
(
(1− γt−2)Pt−2(z)−θ + . . .
))
= (1− γt)Pt(z)−θ + γtP−θt−1st−1,
which, in turn, can be arranged to obtain:
st = (1− γt)rp−θt + γtπθt st−1. (A 2.11)
The rest of the derivations of the non-linear model are described in the main
text of this chapter.
A stationary equilibrium of the economy presented in Section 2.1 consists
of (i)a set of stationary processes Ct, Nt, yt, wt, mct, Rt, λt, rpt, πt, st, γt
that satisfies the conditions (A 2.7), (A 2.10), (A 2.11), (2.6), (2.7), (2.8),
(2.11), (2.12), (2.15), (2.17), and (2.18); and (ii)the condition that goods
market, labor market and financial markets clear. Thus, I have system of
eleven equations in eleven variables. For convenience, I present these eleven
equations in their aggregated form below once again:
C−σ
−1
t = λt, (A 2.12)
Nφt
C−σ
−1
t
= wt, (A 2.13)
λt
RtPt
= βEt
λt+1
Pt+1
, (A 2.14)
Yt = Nt, (A 2.15)
mct = Rtwt, (A 2.16)
rpt =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
1+θ Ct+imct+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
θ Ct+i
, (A 2.17)
Yt = stCt, (A 2.18)
1 = γtπ
θ−1
t−1 + (1− γt)rp1−θt (A 2.19)
st = (1− γt)rp−θt + γtπθt st−1, (A 2.20)
log γt = ωrp log rpt + ωπ log πt−1 + ωR logRt, (A 2.21)
logRt = ρ0 + ρπ log πt + ρL logRt−1 + εRt . (A 2.22)
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A 2.2 (Nonstochastic) Steady State Relations
I assume a positive steady state inflation, i.e. π > 1. This assumption
together with (the steady-state version of) (A 2.14) implies
R = π/β. (A 2.23)
The assumption of a positive steady state inflation, however, is not enough
to pin down the values of γ and rp. Hence, one needs to assign a value to
either γ or rp to obtain a value for the other (for a given value of θ). In
this chapter, following Rotemberg (2005), I assign a value to rp. Then using
(A 2.19), I obtain
γ =
1− rp1−θ
πθ−1 − rp1−θ . (A 2.24)
Notice that a logically consistent price adjustment probability, i.e., 0 < 1 −
γ < 1, requires that 1 < rp < 21/(θ−1) and πrp > 1. Using (A 2.20), I obtain
s =
(1− γ)rp−θ
1− γπθ . (A 2.25)
Finally, (A 2.17) implies that in steady state, the following relation holds:
rp =
θ
θ − 1
∑∞
i=0
(
βγπθ
)i∑∞
i=0 (βγπ
θ−1)i
mc.
Let me define two new parameters λ1 ≡ βγπθ and λ2 ≡ βγπθ−1. Because for
the assumed values of β, γ, π, and θ (cf. Table 2.1), both λ1 and λ2 are less
than one, I can write
mc =
θ − 1
θ
1− λ1
1− λ2 rp. (A 2.26)
Using equations (A 2.13), (A 2.15), (A 2.16), and (A 2.18), I get an expression
describing the steady state level of output, Y =
(
mc
R
) σ
1+σφ s
1
1+σφ . By making
use of the previously stated steady state equations, this last expression can
be written as
Y =
(
β
π
) σ
1+σφ
(
θ − 1
θ
) σ
1+σφ
(
(1− λ1)(1− γ)
(1− λ2)(1− γπθ)
) 1
1+σφ
rp
σ−θ
1+σφ . (A 2.27)
Notice that the first term is the effect of the working capital cost channel.
Second term is the effect of monopolistic competition. Third term is the
joint effect of trend inflation and sticky prices. The final term is the effect of
sticky prices alone. Given our parameter restrictions, the first three effects
are distortionary. If σ < θ, then the final effect is also distortionary.
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A 2.3 Log-Linearization and Log-linearized Equilibrium
Conditions
I continue now with the log-linearization of the system of equations given
by (A 2.12)–(A 2.22). I assume that the equilibrium remains near a steady
state around which I am log-linearizing. Consequently, the properties of the
equilibrium dynamics can be approximated by first order deviations from the
equilibrium.
Let me begin with the first equation of the equilibrium conditions: (A 2.12).
Taking a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state gives
−σC−σ−1C˜t = λλ˜t,
where a tilde over variable denotes its log-deviation from steady state, (e.g.,
X˜t ≡ logXt − logX).11 Because in steady state C−σ−1 = λ, I can simplify
the last expression to obtain
−σC˜t = λ˜t.
I apply this simple approximation method to the system of equations given
above. But to economize on space, I describe below the log-linearization of
one more equation extensively, and present all other equations in their log-
linear form.
The next equation that I describe its log-linearization is a relatively com-
plex equation: (A 2.17), which describes the determinants of the optimal
relative price. Before starting with linearizing the entire equation let us have
a closer look on
∞∑
j=0
βjΓt,t+1
which can be expressed as
1 + βγt+1 + β
2γt+1γt+2 + β
3γt+1γt+2γt+3 . . .
11An incomplete but practically useful explanation of the log-linearization method is as
follows. Let f(X1,t, . . . ,Xm,t) = g(Z1,t, . . . , Zn,t). We can write this relation as
log
(
f(explogX1,t , . . . , explogXm,t)
)
= log
(
g(explogZ1,t , . . . , explogZn,t)
)
.
Take the first order Taylor approximation around the steady state to get
log f(X1, . . . Xm) +
(f1(X1,...,Xm)X1(logX1,t−logX1)+...+fm(X1,...,Xm)Xm(logXm,t−logXm))
f(X1,...,Xm)
≈
log g(Z1, . . . Zn) +
(g1(Z1,...,Zn)X1(logZ1,t−logZ1)+...+gm(X1,...,Zn)Zn(logZn,t−logZn))
f(Z1,...,Zn)
.
Using the steady state relation ((f(X1, . . . ,Xm) = g(Z1, . . . , Zn))) to simplify the last
expression, we can write∑m
i=1 fi(X1, . . . ,Xm)XiX˜i,t ≈
∑n
i=1 gi(Z1, . . . , Zm)ZiZ˜i,t.
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Differentiating this gives
0+βγγ˜t+1+(βγ)
2γ˜t+1+(βγ)
3γ˜t+1+ . . .
+0 + 0 + (βγ)2γ˜t+2 + (βγ)
3γ˜t+2 + . . .
+0 + 0 + 0 + (βγ)3γ˜t+3 + . . .
...
Note that the first line is equal to γ˜t+1
∑∞
j=1(γβ)
j which, in turn, equals
(γβ)1
1−γβ γ˜t+1. In the same fashion, second line equals
(γβ)2
1−γβ γ˜t+2, third line equals
(γβ)3
1−γβ γ˜t+3, forth line. . . Hence, we can express the above sum as
∞∑
j=1
(γβ)j
1− γβ γ˜t+j.
Now rearrange our original optimal price equation as
LHS ≡ rptEt
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
θ Ct+i
=
θ
θ − 1Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
1+θ Ct+imct+i ≡ RHS.
Note that Pt+i
Pt
= Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
. . . Pt+i
Pt+i−1
= πt+1πt+2 . . . πt+i =
∏i
s=1 πt+s. Let me
start with the LHS. Using the definitions of Λt,t+i and Γt,t+i rewrite LHS
as:
LHS = rptC
1−σ−1
t + Et
∞∑
i=1
βi
(
i∏
l=1
γt+lπ
θ−1
t+l
)
C1−σ
−1
t+i .
Differentiating this expression gives
α1
(
r˜pt+
1− σ−1
(1− λ2)−1 C˜t+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i+(θ−1)π˜t+i+ 1− σ
−1
(1− λ2)−1 C˜t+i
))
,
where α1 ≡ rpC1−σ
−1
1−λ2 . In the same fashion, differentiating RHS gives
α2
(
m˜ct + (1− σ−1)C˜t
(1− λ1)−1 +Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i+θπ˜t+i+
m˜ct+i + (1− σ−1)C˜t+i
(1− λ1)−1
))
,
Appendix to Chapter 2 33
where α2 ≡ θmcC1−σ
−1
(θ−1)(1−λ1) . Note that in the discussion of the steady state above,
I stated rp = θ
θ−1
1−λ2
1−λ1mc. Thus α1 = α2. Setting dLHS = dRHS again,
and a bit of algebraic manipulation gives
r˜pt = Et
∞∑
i=0
λi1(1− λ1)m˜ct+i+
+Et
∞∑
i=0
(
λi1(1− λ1)− λi2(1− λ2)
)
(1− σ−1)C˜t+i+
+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i + θπ˜t+i
)
−Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i + (θ− 1)π˜t+i
)
. (A 2.28)
Now lead (A 2.28) one period, take period t expectations, and use the law of
iterated expectations to get:
Etr˜pt+1 = Et
∞∑
i=0
λi1(1− λ1)m˜ct+i+1+
+Et
∞∑
i=0
(
λi1(1− λ1)− λi2(1− λ2)
)
(1− σ−1)C˜t+i+1+
+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i+1+θπ˜t+i+1
)
−Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i+1+(θ−1)π˜t+i+1
)
. (A 2.29)
Lead (A 2.28) two periods, take period t expectations, and use the law of
iterated expectations to get:
Etr˜pt+2 = Et
∞∑
i=0
λi1(1− λ1)m˜ct+i+2+
+Et
∞∑
i=0
(
λi1(1− λ1)− λi2(1− λ2)
)
(1− σ−1)C˜t+i+2+
+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i+2+θπ˜t+i+2
)
−Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i+2+(θ−1)π˜t+i+2
)
. (A 2.30)
Multiply (A 2.29) through by λ1, and subtract the result from (A 2.28) to
get:
r˜pt − λ1Etr˜pt+1 = (1− λ1)(m˜ct + (1− σ−1)C˜t+
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+Etλ1
(
γ˜t+1 + θπ˜t+1
)
− (1− σ−1)Et
∞∑
i=0
λi2(C˜t+i − λ1C˜t+i+1)+
−Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i − λ1γ˜t+i+1 + (θ − 1)(π˜t+i − λ1π˜t+i+1)
)
. (A 2.31)
Multiply (A 2.29) through by λ2, and subtract the result from (A 2.28) to
get:
r˜pt − λ2Etr˜pt+1 = −(1− λ2)(1− σ−1)C˜t − Etλ2
(
γ˜t+1 + (θ − 1)π˜t+1
)
+(1− σ−1)Et
∞∑
i=0
λi1(C˜t+i − λ2C˜t+i+1)+
+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i − λ2γ˜t+i+1 + θ(π˜t+i − λ2π˜t+i+1)
)
. (A 2.32)
Multiply (A 2.30) through by λ1λ2, and subtract the result from (A 2.28) to
get:
r˜pt − λ1λ2Etr˜pt+2 = Et
∞∑
i=0
λi1(1− λ1)(m˜ct+i − λ1λ2m˜ct+i+2)+
+Et
∞∑
i=0
(
λi1(1− λ1)− λi2(1− λ2)
)
(1− σ−1)(C˜t+i − λ1λ2C˜t+i+2)+
+Et
∞∑
i=1
λi1
(
γ˜t+i + θπ˜t+i − λ1λ2γ˜t+i+2 − θλ1λ2π˜t+i+2
)
+
−Et
∞∑
i=1
λi2
(
γ˜t+i+(θ−1)π˜t+i−λ1λ2γ˜t+i+2− (θ−1)λ1λ2π˜t+i+2
)
. (A 2.33)
Two more steps left: First, add (A 2.31) to (A 2.32); then from the re-
sult, subtract (A 2.33) in order to obtain the final equation describing the
dynamics of the optimal relative price:
r˜pt = Et
[
(λ1 + λ2)r˜pt+1 − (λ1λ2)r˜pt+2+
+(θ(λ1 − λ2) + λ2) π˜t+1 − (λ1λ2)π˜t+2+
+(1− λ1)m˜ct − λ2(1− λ1)m˜ct+1+
+(λ2 − λ1)(1− σ−1)C˜t + (λ1 − λ2)(1− σ−1)C˜t+1+
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+(λ1 − λ2)γ˜t+1
]
. (A 2.34)
In addition to (A 2.34), the other log-linearized equations used to derive
the results are given by
optimal consumption: C˜t = λ˜t, (A 2.35)
labor supply : φN˜t +
1
σ
C˜t = w˜t, (A 2.36)
Euler equation: λ˜t − Etλ˜t+1 = R˜t − Etπ˜t+1, (A 2.37)
production function: Y˜t = N˜t, (A 2.38)
real marginal costs: m˜ct = w˜t + R˜t, (A 2.39)
resource constraint : Y˜t = s˜t + C˜t, (A 2.40)
inflation: π˜t = (γ
−1π1−θ − 1)r˜pt +
π1−θ − 1
(1− γ)(θ − 1) γ˜t, (A 2.41)
price dispersion: s˜t = θ(γπ
θ − 1)X˜t + γ(π
θ − 1)
1− γ γ˜t + θγπ
θπ˜t + γπ
θs˜t−1,
(A 2.42)
probability of price adjustment : γ˜t = ωrpr˜pt+ωππ˜t−1+ωRR˜t, (A 2.43)
monetary policy : R˜t = ρ0 + ρππ˜t + ρLR˜t−1 + εRt . (A 2.44)
Note that if steady state inflation is zero, π = 1, the coefficients of γ˜t are
zero in (A 2.34), (A 2.42) and (A 2.41), i.e., variations in γt do not have any
effect on the dynamics of the economy. Equations (A 2.34), (A 2.43), and
(A 2.41) constitute the Phillips-curve block of the model.
Given the system of equations (A 2.34)–(A 2.44) and corresponding pa-
rameter values, one can use Blanchard and Kahn (1980) (local) conditions
to check the existence and uniqueness of a solution for this system. As men-
tioned above, to solve and simulate the model, I used the computer algorithm
developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001), but one can use other al-
gorithms, such as those developed by Anderson and Moore (1985), Juillard
(1996) and his team, Uhlig (1997), or King and Watson (1998). The codes I
used to generate my results are, of course, available upon a request.
Chapter 3
Fair Wages, Fair Prices &
Sluggish Inflation
In models of monetary business cycles, mechanisms of sluggish adjustment
of prices and/or wages play a central role for explaining the propagation of
monetary policy shocks. As mechanisms of sluggish price/wage adjustment,
the models of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982), and Calvo (1983) have been
widely used by researchers studying monetary policy. Because none of these
mechanisms can account for the observed lag-lead relation between inflation
and output, indexation schemes, as in the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2005), or sticky information as in the model of Mankiw and Reis
(2002) have attracted growing attention.
Empirical evidence of price stickiness supports neither indexation schemes
nor sticky information. For example, Fabiani et al. (2006), summarizing
the results of survey studies conducted by the Inflation Persistence Network
(IPN) of the European Central Bank in the Euro Area, conclude that long-
term relationships between customers and firms are the most relevant ex-
planation of price stickiness, and that there is no supporting evidence for
indexation and sticky information.1 In analogy to the case of price setting,
empirical research on wage setting has shown that long-term relationships in
labor markets are an important determinant of wage stickiness (Blinder and
Choi 1990, Campbell and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999). The motivation put
forward by Akerlof (2007, p.27) is also worth quoting:
1Several other survey-type studies on price setting behavior of firms document results
similar to that of the IPN studies. See Blinder et al. (1998) for the US, Hall et al. (2000)
for the UK, Amirault et al. (2004) for Canada, and Apel et al. (2005) for Sweden.
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. . . evidence suggests that wage earners and customers have views
on what wages and prices should be. The reflection of such views
in utility functions produce trade-offs between inflation and un-
employment. Those trade-offs have significant implications for
economic policy.
Consistent with the evidence, the current chapter presents a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) with fair wages and fair prices,
and analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks. As Ball and Romer
(1990) and Chari et al. (2000) have shown that sticky prices alone cannot
generate large output effects of monetary shocks, the focus of the sticky-price
literature has been mainly on explaining the large output-effects of monetary
shocks by incorporating real rigidities. Following the suggestion of Gali and
Gertler (1999) that real rigidities may also be needed to account for inflation
dynamics, I focus to explain the sluggish adjustment of inflation to monetary
shocks. My results show that the model can explain the observed lag-lead
relation between inflation and output. Following a monetary impulse, output
peaks after three quarters and inflation peaks after four quarters. Subjecting
the model both to monetary and technology shocks results in a lead-lag cor-
relation between output and inflation which closely matches that in US data.
The fair-wage block of my model builds on the recent contributions of
Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004), both of
which, in turn, resort to the “gift-exchange” efficiency wages theory tracing
back to Akerlof (1982). According to the gift-exchange efficiency wages the-
ory, workers are willing to provide effort beyond some reference level of effort
if they feel that their firm treats them well. Firms, in turn, seek to motivate
workers by offering a wage above the market-clearing wage. The optimizing
behavior of workers and firms results in structural unemployment. Collard
and de la Croix extend the efficiency wage theory in a flexible price DSGE
framework by allowing effort to depend on past wages. This intertemporal
link in wage setting renders the adjustment of wages sluggish. Danthine and
Kurmann incorporate this intertemporal link into a sticky price DSGE model.
The model by Danthine and Kurmann, however, differs from my model as,
in their model, prices are set a` la Calvo (1983), and money holdings are mo-
tivated via a cash in advance constraint on consumption and investment.
The fair-price block of my model builds on the recent contribution of
Rotemberg (2005). Rotemberg assumes that price increases are viewed by
costumers as fair and justifiable only if these increases are triggered by cost
increases. Otherwise customers get upset, and the relationship between the
firm and its customers breaks down. Thus, fear of customer anger gives rise
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to a sluggish adjustment of prices. In addition to the evidence coming from
survey studies, there is a large number of studies in applied economics that
supports this view. For example, Zbaracki et al. (2004) find that of the
overall costs of price adjustment, 74% is associated with customer relations
(customer cost), 22% with managerial costs, and 4% with menu costs.2 In
Rotemberg’s model, consumers have imperfect information about the cost
of firms, but they receive random signals about costs. Rotemberg specifies
a setting where relative prices and past inflation are signals about the fair-
ness of price increases, and, in particular, past inflation is a signal of cost
increases. For this reason, the probability that firms can reset its price is a
function of the relative price and past inflation.
Fair wages and fair prices are the two key features of my model. Several
researchers have studied the implications of similar specifications. Two early
antecedents of my analysis are the works of Phelps and Winter (1970) and
Okun (1981). Phelps and Winter provide a formal model of monopolistic
competition with customer markets where, due to the imperfect diffusion of
information on prices, customers remain with their current sellers. Okun sug-
gests that inflation inertia stems from the long-term relationships (“invisible
handshakes”) in labor and customer markets. Ball and Romer (1990) show
that a combination of imperfect competition and menu costs with imperfect
information in customer markets or with efficiency wages can generate large
effects of nominal shocks. The current chapter, however, provides the first
study that incorporates the combination of fair-wages and fair-prices into a
DSGE framework.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next two sec-
tions lay down the model and its calibration. The section after details and
discusses the results of the simulated model. The last section summarizes
and offers some concluding remarks.
3.1 The Model Economy
The economy operates in discrete time, and consists of households, perfectly
competitive firms, monopolistically competitive firms, and a monetary au-
thority. The numbers of households and firms are assumed to be large. For
tractability, I assume a continuum of households, indexed by j, and monop-
2Zbaracki et al. (2004) also argue that the main reason behind such high managerial
costs is the customer costs.
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olistically competitive firms, indexed by z, with j, z ∈ [0, 1].
3.1.1 Households
In each household j, a proportion 0 < N jt < 1 of its members is employed,
while the rest is unemployed as a consequence of efficiency wages. On the
individual level, following Alexopoulos (2004) and Danthine and Kurmann
(2004), employment is randomly allocated across the members of each house-
hold, and the proportion N jt is the same across households (i.e. N
j
t = Nt).
Consumption is equally redistributed across the members of a household. As
a result, households’ members are both ex-ante and ex-post identical.
Household j inelastically supplies a unit of labor, and decides on the
sequences of consumption, Cjt , nominal money balances M
j
t , effort e
j
t , and
nominal bond holdings Bjt . The expected present value of lifetime utility of
a representative household j is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
log(Cjt − hCjt−1) + χ1− σm
(
M jt
Pt
)1−σm
−N jt G(ejt)
 , (3.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, 0 ≤ h < 1 is a measure of the degree
of (internal) habit formation, and 0 < χ and 0 < σm are money demand
parameters.3 Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on
period t information, Pt is a nominal price index, G(ejt) is an effort function
determining the disutility that the household j derives from effort. Following
Danthine and Kurmann (2004), the form for the effort function is given by
G(ejt) =
[
ejt −
(
φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 lnNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1
)]2
, (3.2)
where wjt (wt) denotes household j’s (aggregate) real wage rate.
4 The terms
in parenthesis determine the norm that household j resorts to by providing
effort. Accordingly, if the household provides more effort than the reference
level, i.e. the norm, its utility decreases because households do not like pro-
viding effort. On the other hand, if the household provides less effort than
the reference level, its utility decreases again because of fairness concerns,
3For better comparability of my results with the results of Christiano et al. (2005),
I assumed internal habit formation rather than external habit formation. The model in
Chapter 4 features external habit formation.
4See Danthine and Kurmann (2004) and the references therein for a discussion on the
form of the effort function.
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i.e. household does not want to provide lower effort in exchange for higher
compensation, analogous to gift exchange behavior (Akerlof 1982). The ref-
erence level of effort is assumed to be increasing in wjt , and decreasing in
Nt, wt, and w
j
t−1. The assumptions for these sign restrictions are as follows.
The parameter φ0 is an arbitrary constant. A positive change in the real
wage of household j motivates the household to work harder, i.e. φ1 > 0,
φ4 < 0. The change in (rather than only the level of) compensation being
also a determinant of effort is a key assumption in my setting as in the set-
tings of Collard and de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004).
Furthermore, in his extensive survey of questionnaire and interview studies
on the origins of wage rigidity Bewley (2002) shows that change in wages
is an important determinant effort. A higher aggregate level of employment
discourages household j because it would be easier for her to find a new job
if she gets unemployed because of providing low effort, φ2 < 0. Finally a
higher aggregate real wage decreases the relative real wage of the household,
which, in turn, is perceived to be unfair by household j, and decreases the
level of effort, φ3 < 0.
The period-t budget constraint is given by
R−1t B
j
t +M
j
t
Pt
+ Cjt =
Bjt−1 +M
j
t−1 + T
j
t
Pt
+ wjtN
j
t + Φ
j
t , (3.3)
where Rt is the gross nominal returns on bond holdings, T
j
t is the lump-sum
transfers from the monetary authority, and Φjt is the sum of the household’s
real profit income.
Letting λt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint, the first order conditions for the household j can be written as(
Cjt − hCjt−1
)−1 − hβ (EtCjt+1 − hCjt )−1 = λt, (3.4)
χ
(
M jt
Pt
)−σm
= λt − βEt
[
λt+1
πt+1
]
, (3.5)
ejt = φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1, (3.6)
λt = RtβEt
[
λt+1
πt+1
]
, (3.7)
where πt denotes gross inflation, πt = Pt/Pt−1. Additionally, I assume that
the usual transversality condition holds.
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3.1.2 Firms
There are two types of sectors on the production side: a final goods sector
and an intermediate goods sector. The final goods sector is perfectly com-
petitive, and the intermediate goods sector is monopolistically competitive.
Final Goods Sector
The production technology for final goods is given by
Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
yt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, (3.8)
where 1 < θ is the elasticity of substitution among differentiated intermediate
goods, Yt is the final good, and yt(z) is an intermediate good. Because the
final goods sector is perfectly competitive, final goods producers maximize
their profits by taking the price of their good and the price of their input,
denoted by Pt(z), as given. The profit maximization problem of a typical
final good firm can be written as
max
yt(z)
Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(z)yt(z)dz.
The first order condition for this problem yields the usual demand schedule
for good z:
yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Yt. (3.9)
The zero profit condition, together with equation (3.9), implies
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
. (3.10)
Intermediate Goods Sector
Each firm in the intermediate goods sector consists of a production unit and
a pricing unit. The production unit minimizes the cost of production, and
the pricing unit maximizes the profits of the firm. The production technology
for intermediate goods is given by
yt(z) = Atet(z)Nt(z), (3.11)
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where et(z)Nt(z) is the effective labor service rented from the households,
and At is an aggregate technology shock to productivity.
5 The law of motion
of the technology shock is governed by
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + ǫAt , (3.12)
where ǫAt is an independently and identically distributed innovation with
mean zero and standard deviation σǫA .
When minimizing the cost of production, the production unit faces two
constraints: The production should sustain the demand and the effort should
sustain the norm. Formally, we have
min
Nt(z),wt(z),et(z)
wt(z)Nt(z)
subject to yt(z) ≤ Atet(z)Nt(z) and
et(z) = φ0+ φ1 logwt(z) + φ2 logNt+ φ3 logwt+ φ4 logwt−1.
In the second constraint, following Danthine and Kurmann (2004), I replaced
wt−1(z) with wt−1 (cf. equation (3.2)). In this way, cost minimization be-
comes a static problem, implying that firms do not account for the conse-
quences of offering a higher wage today for the future effort of households
(Collard and de la Croix (2000)).
Letting mct(z) denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the de-
mand constraint, the first order conditions for the production unit can be
written as
wt(z) = mct(z)
yt(z)
Nt(z)
, (3.13)
Nt(z) = mct(z)
yt(z)
et(z)
φ1
wt(z)
. (3.14)
The Lagrange multiplier mct(z) is identical to marginal cost, which equals
average cost due to the constant returns to scale form of the production
technology. Substituting equation (3.13) into (3.14) implies the Solow (1979)
condition
et(z) = φ1. (3.15)
5In the appendix to this chapter, I extend my model to allow for investment dynamics.
Simulation results for the extended model show that this extension does not bring about
a significant change in my main results.
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The Solow condition induces the elasticity of effort with respect to the real
wage rate to be 1. That is, the optimal real wage rate should be set such
that a variation in the real wage rate does not affect the wage-effort ratio.
Hence, under the Solow condition, the optimal real wage rate implied by 3.13
minimizes the cost of effective labor.
When maximizing the profits, the pricing unit can choose a price different
from marginal cost as a result of monopolistically competitive environment.
When doing so, the pricing unit faces the demand constraint given by equa-
tion (3.9). Moreover, as in Rotemberg (2005), the pricing unit can change
the price in every period with probability 0 < 1− γt < 1. The maximization
problem of the pricing unit can be expressed as
max
Pt(z)
Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+iyt+i(z) [Pt(z)− Pt+imct+i(z)] ,
s.t. yt(z) =
[
Pt(z)
Pt
]−θ
Yt.
The variable Λt,t+i denotes the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs
between periods t and t + i and defined as Λt,t+i ≡ βiπ−1t,t+i
(
λt+i
λt
)
, with
πt,t+i ≡ Pt+i/Pt. The variable Γt,t+i denotes the probability that the pricing
unit cannot change the price between the periods t and t + i and defined
as Γt,t+i ≡
∏i
l=1 γt+l, with Γt,t ≡ 1. Using the demand curve to substitute
out yt(z) in the objective function of the pricing unit and maximizing it over
Pt(z) gives
Et
∞∑
i=0
Λt,t+iΓt,t+iyt+i(z)
[
P ∗t (z)−
θ
θ − 1Pt+imct+i(z)
]
= 0, (3.16)
where P ∗t (z) is the optimal price. Equation (3.16) illustrates the standard
implication of staggered price adjustment mechanisms that the optimal price
maximizes the profits when average future expected marginal revenues equal
average future expected marginal costs. As in Chapter 2, the probability of
price adjustment in the averaging factor is an endogenous variable, i.e., price
adjustment of an intermediate firm depends on the state of the economy.6
6Setting the probability of price adjustment, γt, constant reduces the price setting
mechanism to that of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).
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What follows briefly rationalizes the idea behind the fair pricing that
gives rise to endogenous price adjustment.7,8 Following Rotemberg (2005), I
assume that firms in the intermediate goods sector are reluctant to change
prices because they have some sort of long term relationships with their cus-
tomers, who do not like price increases. After an increase in the price of a firm
in the intermediate sector, the relationship of that firm with its customers
breaks down unless the customers believe that the increase in the price was
triggered by cost increases, and, thus, fair. Furthermore, there is sufficiently
large trend inflation, which, in turn, makes price decreases non-optimal.
Customers do not have perfect information about the cost changes of the
firms in the intermediate goods sector, and evaluate the fairness of the firms
by the signals they receive. As in Rotemberg (2005), the relative price, de-
noted by rpt ≡ P ∗t (z)/Pt and lagged inflation, πt−1, are signals about the
perceived fairness of price increases.9 Because, ceteris paribus, an increase in
the relative price will imply that the absolute price is increased more relative
to other prices, rpt is a ‘negative’ signal of fairness. Because, ceteris paribus,
higher inflation implies an overall increase in costs, πt−1 is a ‘positive’ signal
of fairness.
Accordingly, firms adjust their prices only when they believe that the
price increase will not bring about customer resistance, i.e., a sharp fall in
demand. Thus, the random signals that govern the fairness evaluation of a
price increase also govern the probability of the price adjustment:
log γt = ωrp log rpt + ωπ log πt−1. (3.17)
As regards the signs of the parameters, an increase in the relative price will
decrease the reset probability, thus, ωrp is positive. As higher inflation will
imply more frequent price adjustments, ωπ is negative, so that the reset prob-
ability rises with higher inflation.
7My discussion shall be brief because the setting of the fair pricing that gives rise to
endogenous price adjustment is principally the same as in Chapter 2. The mere difference
to Chapter 2 is that the fair-price setting in this chapter does not assume the new cost
channel, and, thus, it is identical to the setting developed by Rotemberg (2005).
8For a detailed discussion on the microeconomics of fair-price specification, see Rotem-
berg (2005) or my introductory chapter of this dissertation.
9Because all new price setters will set the same price, rpt does not have any firm index
(Yun (1996)).
3.1 The Model Economy 45
3.1.3 The Monetary Authority
The lump-sum transfers from the monetary authority are financed by newly
printed money:∫ 1
0
T jt dj =Mt −Mt−1, (3.18)
where Mt is the money supply which grows at a gross rate of mt, namely
Mt = mtMt−1. (3.19)
The law of motion of the growth rate of money is governed by
logmt = log π
1−ρm + ρm logmt−1 + ǫmt , (3.20)
where ǫmt is serially uncorrelated mean zero innovation.
10 Equation (3.20)
ensures that, in the steady state, the (gross) growth rate of money supply
equals (gross) inflation.
3.1.4 Aggregation
I assume symmetry across households and across firms. Symmetry across
firms implies that the firms that can reset their prices choose the same new
price. Therefore, the price index (3.10) can be expressed as
1 = γtπ
θ−1
t−1 + (1− γt)rp1−θt . (3.21)
Defining a new variable as st ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
dz and applying the same
reasoning used to derive equation (3.21), st can be expressed as
st = (1− γt)rp−θt + γtπθt st−1. (3.22)
Integrating both sides of equation (3.9) over z implies
Y it = stYt,
where Y it ≡
∫ 1
0
yt(z)dz. Thus, aggregate production differs from aggregate
real purchases by an amount of st. A natural interpretation of st is that it is
10I assume that the monetary authority conducts its policy by a money supply rule
rather than by an interest rate rule because this assumption allows for a direct comparison
of my results with those of Danthine and Kurmann(2004) and Christiano et al. (2005).
Moreover, I have also explored the implications of an interest rate rule in the model of
this chapter. The effect is little or no change in my results.
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the price dispersion generated by the assumed price setting mechanism. The
price dispersion is a costly distortion because, by Jensen’s inequality, st is
bounded below by 1 (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2004).
The market clearing conditions for the markets of final goods, bonds,
labor, and money are given by∫ 1
0
(
Cjt
)
dj = Yt,
∫ 1
0
Bjtdj = 0,
∫ 1
0
Nt(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
N jt dj, and∫ 1
0
M jt dj =Mt.
3.2 Calibration of the Model
The benchmark calibration of the model is summarized in Table 3.1. For the
parameters β and θ, I assume values that are consistent with those used in
the business-cycle literature. Setting one period to equal a quarter of a year,
I set the discount factor β = 1.03−1/4 so that the annual real interest rate in
steady-state is 3%. I set θ = 10, implying a markup rate of 11%.
For the parameters h and σm, I draw on the work of Christiano et al.
(2005). For the degree of habit formation, h, Christiano et al. report esti-
mates between 0.52 and 0.71. I assumed a value of h = 0.62. For the value of
σm, Christiano et al. report estimates between 10.12 and 11.09. I assumed
σm = 10.85.
To set the parameters of the effort function, I derived the fair wage func-
tion by substituting the Solow condition (equation 3.15) into the optimal
effort supply condition (equation 3.6):
logwt = η1 logNt + η2 logwt−1, (3.23)
where η1 ≡ −φ2/(φ1+φ3) and η2 ≡ −φ4/(φ1+φ3). Drawing on the estimates
of Danthine and Kurmann (2004), I set η1 = 0.03 and η2 = 0.99.
I assume a positive level of steady-state inflation so that in the log-
linearized model, the variations in the frequency of price adjustment have an
effect on the propagation of shocks.11 I set π = 1.041/4, so that the annual
11The coefficient of γt in the log-linearized version of equation (3.16) and that of equation
(3.21) are, respectively, γβpiθ − γβpiθ−1 and π1−θ−1(1−γ)(θ−1) . Thus setting pi = 1 reduces
these coefficients to zero. Besides, trend inflation is confirmed by economic data, and has
important implications for macroeconomic dynamics. See, for example, Ball et al. (1988),
Ascari (2004), and Cogley and Sbordone (2006) for implications of trend inflation in New
Keynesian frameworks.
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters
Discount factor: β = 1.03−1/4
Semi elasticity of money demand: σm = 10.85
Degree of habit formation:; h = 0.62
Elasticity of real wage w.r.t.
a)employment: η1 ≡ −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.03
b)past real wage: η2 ≡ −φ4/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.99
Demand elasticity: θ = 10
Steady-state value of reset probability: 1− γ = 0.25
Steady-state value of gross inflation: pi = 1.041/4
Elasticity of γt w.r.t.
a)optimal relative price: ωrp = 1.5
b)past inflation: ωπ = −15
Serial correlation of the money growth rate: ρm = 0.60
Serial correlation of the technology process: ρA = 0.96
Standard deviation of the monetary innovation: σǫµ = 0.0060
Standard deviation of the technology innovation: σǫA = 0.0064
inflation is 4% in steady state, which is approximately equal to the postwar
average inflation rate in many industrialized countries. I set γ = 3/4, imply-
ing that, on average, firms adjust their prices once a year in the steady state.
An average frequency of the price adjustment of four quarters is roughly con-
sistent with the findings of Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
The setting of the parameters that characterize the probability of price
adjustment are based on the papers of Rotemberg (2005) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008). Nakamura and Steinsson report that inflation and fre-
quency of price adjustment are highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.81.
Rotemberg assigns ωp = 2.5 and ωπ = −15. Applying these values in my
model, however, results in a correlation of 0.37 between inflation and reset
probability. Therefore, I lowered ωp to 1.5 and kept ωπ = −15. Applying
these values in my model generates a correlation of 0.72 between inflation
and reset probability.
Finally, I set the persistence parameters of the shock processes, (ρm, ρA),
to (0.6, 0.96) and the standard deviations of innovations, (σǫµ , σǫA), to
(0.0060, 0.0064). These values in my model result in a variance decomposi-
tion of output and inflation where around 70% of output fluctuations and
54% of inflation fluctuations are due to technology shocks. Such a variance
decomposition is in line with the empirical evidence reported in the literature
(See, for example, Christiano et al. 2003; Altig et al. 2005).
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3.3 Simulation Results
This section assesses the implications of fair wages, fair prices, and their
interaction for the dynamics of key variables in the log-linearized version
of the baseline model. To check the performance of my model, I shall
report also the simulation results of three variants of the baseline model.
The first variant is a model that features a price setting mechanism for-
mulated by Calvo (1983). In the model featuring Calvo-type price setting,
log γt = log γ replaces equation (3.17) of the baseline model. The second
variant is a model that features a Walrasian labor market. In the model
featuring a Walrasian labor market, optimal labor supply condition given by
N jt = w
j
t [(C
j
t −hCjt−1)−1−hβ(Cjt+1−hCjt )−1] replaces the optimal effort sup-
ply condition of the baseline model. Finally, the third variant is a model that
features Calvo-type price setting and a Walrasian labor market. Because I
shall refer to these variants repeatedly, I suggest using the following short-
hand: No-fair-prices (No-FP) for the first variant, no-fair-wages (No-FW) for
the second variant and no-fair-prices/wages (No-FPW) for the third variant.
3.3.1 Selected Second Moments
As a first performance check of my model, I calculate four theoretical and
empirical moments. These four moments are
(i) the correlation of the change in inflation with detrended output;
(ii) the ratio of the standard deviation of quarterly change in output to
that of the yearly change in output;
(iii) the correlation of detrended real wages with detrended hours worked;
(iv) the correlation of detrended real wages with detrended output.
The reason for choosing to present these statistics is that they illustrate cru-
cial features of business cycles that standard models of monetary business
cycles fail to reproduce (Mankiw and Reis 2006).
Table 3.2 compares the theoretical moments of the baseline model and of
its variants with the empirical ones of US data. The data are quarterly from
1959:1 to 2006:4, and downloadable from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and Bureau of Labor Statistics.12 The empirical moments imply that
12All series are for the non-farm business sector. Output and hours worked are converted
into per-capita terms using a measure of the US population over age 16. Inflation is the
log-change in the implicit price deflator. The real wage rate is measured by the nominal
compensation deflated by the implicit price deflator. Detrended variables are constructed
with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.
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Table 3.2: Selected Moments
US data Baseline No-FP No-FW No-FPW No Habit
ρ(pit+2 − pit−2, yt) 0.42 0.50 0.28 0.10 −0.23 0.54
σ(yt − yt−1)/σ(yt − yt−4) 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.50
ρ(wt, nt) −0.07 0.16 0.16 0.77 0.79 0.17
ρ(wt, yt) 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.87 0.89 0.15
Note: ρ(pit+2 − pit−2, yt) denotes the correlation of the change in inflation with detrended
output, σ(yt − yt−1)/σ(yt − yt−4) denotes the ratio of the standard deviation of quarterly
change in output to that of the yearly change in output, ρ(wt, nt) denotes the correlation
of detrended real wages with detrended hours worked, and ρ(wt, yt) denotes the correlation
of detrended real wages with detrended output.
(i) inflation is procyclical;
(ii) output gradually responds to shocks as the statistic is less than one
half;13
(iii) real wages and employment are weakly correlated;
(iv) real wages and output are weakly correlated.
Note that the baseline model features four frictions: monopolistic compe-
tition, habit formation, fair wages, and fair prices. The latter two are the key
specifications of the baseline model. It appears from Table 3.2 that of these
two key specifications, fair wages plays the most important role in moving
the model in the right direction to account for the procyclicality of inflation
and for the weak correlation of real wages. The models featuring a Walrasian
labor market (columns under No-FW and No-FPW) generate much too low
inflation-output correlation and much too high real wage-employment corre-
lation and real wage-output correlation. Removing habit formation from the
baseline model (the column under No Habit) not only clears away the gradual
response of output, but also worsens the other statistics slightly. When we
compare the no-fair-price model with no-fair-wage model, it seems that the
fair-price specification is not very important for output inflation dynamics.
Figure 3.1, however, shows that this is not the case.
Figure 3.1 depicts the cross-correlations of the output with the leads and
lags of inflation. The line marked with a diamond sign corresponds to the
correlations in the US output and inflation data from 1959:1 to 2006:4, both
13If output evolved as a random walk, the ratio of he standard deviation of quarterly
change in output to that of the yearly change in output would be one half.
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HP-filtered. The cross-correlation functions for the US data illustrate that
output co-moves positively with future inflation and negatively with lagged
inflation. Furthermore, inflation follows output with a lag of 4 quarters (Gali
and Gertler 1999, Den Haan and Sumner 2004, Wang and Wen 2007). While
only the models featuring fair wages (solid line and dashed line) can generate
data where output co-moves positively with future inflation and negatively
with lagged inflation, only the baseline model can account for the shape
of the actual cross correlation function. The baseline model errs mainly
in accounting for the exact degrees of correlations. The cross correlation
functions for models of No-FW (dot-dashed line) and No-FPW (dotted line)
are far too different than that implied by the actual data.
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Note: The figure plots the cross-correlations of the output with the leads and lags of infla-
tion. The horizontal axis measures k (leads/lags). The vertical axis measures the cross-
correlations.
Figure 3.1: Dynamic cross-correlations: output(t), inflation(t+k)
Thus, in my model, fair-wage and fair-price specifications are necessary to
account for some key features of the data. We can now assess the implications
of fair-wage and fair-price specifications for the transmission of monetary
policy shocks.
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3.3.2 Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks
To study the transmission of monetary policy shocks I calculate the impulse
response functions with the impulse being a unit standard-deviation shock
to the money growth rate. Figure 3.2 depicts the impulse response functions
Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions for a Monetary Shock
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Note: The figure plots the responses of key variables to a unit standard-deviation positive
shock to money growth rate. The horizontal axis measures quarters. The vertical axis
measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
for the baseline model (solid line), for the No-FP model (dashed line), for the
No-FW model (dot-dashed line), and for the No-FPW model (dotted line).
In the two models featuring a Walrasian labor market (No-FW and No-
FPW), the persistence of output responses (measured, for example, by the
half life of the output response) is considerably lower than the two models
featuring fair wages (baseline and No-FP). The intuition behind this result
is that in models featuring a Walrasian labor market the adjustment in the
labor market takes place both in hours-worked and in the real wage rate, and
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the impact effect of the monetary impulse on the real wage rate is around
three times as large as the impact effect on hours-worked. Consequently,
the impact effect on inflation is large, and dies rapidly out, which, in turn,
result in the low persistence of the output response. Another implication of
the models featuring a Walrasian labor market is that in these models the
liquidity effect is much weaker than in the models featuring fair wages.14
In the two models featuring the fair-price setting (baseline and No-FW),
the persistence of output responses is lower than the two models featuring
Calvo price setting. To understand this result note that in the models featur-
ing the fair-price setting customer resistance to price increases decreases with
past inflation. Hence, the inflationary effect of the monetary shock gives rise
to an increase in the frequency of price adjustment after the first quarter.
The increase in the frequency of price adjustment feeds back inflation, which,
in turn, decreases the output persistence.
As regards the lead-lag relation between inflation and output, only the
baseline model displays one quarter delay between the peaks of the output
and inflation responses. In the models featuring Calvo price setting (No-FP
and No-FPW), output counterfactually lags inflation. Removing the fair-
wage setting from the baseline model brings about the result that both the
inflation response and the output response reach their peaks in the second
quarter. Thus, the gradual adjustment of the real wage gives rise to inflation
inertia. But this inertia in inflation caused by the fair-wage specification is
not enough to generate a realistic inflation response. To this end, we need
also the fair-price specification so that the inflation response displays a hump-
shaped pattern and also lags the output response.
To sum up, the two key specifications of the baseline model, namely fair-
wage and fair-price settings, are also the keys to generate realistic output-
inflation dynamics in the aftermath of a monetary shock.
3.3.3 Robustness Checks
Are the results presented so far robust to the calibration of my key specifica-
tions? In terms of some basic statistics, Table 3.3 presents a detailed answer
to this question. These basic statistics include, in addition to the
14The liquidity effect is the decrease in the nominal interest rate following an expansion
of monetary aggregates. Standard New Keynesian models fail to generate the liquidity
effect (Keen 2004).
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Table 3.3: Robustness Checks
Benchmark Calibration of Fair-Wage Setting Calibration of Fair-Price Setting
Calibration
η1 η2 (ωrp, ωπ)
0.02 0.05 0.075 0.6 0.8 0.9 (0.18,−5) (0.63,−10) (2.65,−20)
ρ(pit+2 − pit−2, yt) 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.35 0.41 0.62
σ(yt − yt−1)/σ(yt − yt−4) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.32
ρ(wt, nt) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.93 0.74 0.50 0.16 0.16 0.16
ρ(wt, yt) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.89 0.67 0.42 0.06 0.07 0.09
Output Multiplier 5.17 6.75 3.42 2.24 20.55 14.92 10.43 8.23 6.68 3.48
Inflation Multiplier 2.86 2.80 2.91 2.93 2.41 2.56 2.70 2.70 2.76 3.13
Lag(pi, y) 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 −1 0 3
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selected moments of Table 3.2, output multiplier, inflation multiplier and the
lag-lead relation between inflation and output. Output multiplier (inflation
multiplier) measures the sum of the output (inflation) responses to a mon-
etary shock over 15 quarters. The lag-lead relation between inflation and
output is represented by a statistic denoted as lag(π, y) which measures the
difference between the delays in the peaks of the responses of output and
inflation to a monetary shock. A negative lag implies inflation leads output.
By choosing numerical values for the calibration of the fair wage function
(equation (3.23)) I consider three cases that cover also the lower and up-
per estimates of C¸enesiz and Pierdzioch (2008): η1 ∈ {0.02, 0.05, 0.075} and
η2 ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 0.9}. By choosing numerical values for the calibration of the
function that governs the probability of price adjustment (equation (3.17)),
I consider three cases, and in each case, as in the benchmark calibration,
the parameters of the function are adjusted such that the implied correlation
between inflation and the reset probability is 0.72: (ωrp, ωπ) = (0.18,−5),
(ωrp, ωπ) = (0.63,−10), and (ωrp, ωπ) = (2.65,−20).
From Table 3.3, it is notable that the gradual response of output to shocks
is robust to the calibration of the fair-wage and fair-price settings. The rea-
son for this is that in my model, gradual response of output is mainly driven
by the assumption of habit formation in consumption.
From the columns under η1, it turns out that the lower values of η1 give
rise to an increase in inflation inertia, which, in turn, increases the persis-
tence of the output response. Given that the model implies proportional
output and employment responses, a lower value of η1 implies that the real
wage is less contingent on aggregate demand changes, and, thus, more rigid.
Accordingly, lower values of η1 indicates less volatile inflation.
As regards the calibration of η2, the responses of output to a monetary
shock become more persistent when the current real wage rate depends less
on its past value. Given that η1 is fixed at its benchmark value of 0.03, low-
ering η2 causes added rigidity in the adjustment of real wages. This, in turn,
decelerates the adjustment of marginal cost and inflation, and increases the
resistance of customers to price increases, both of which give rise to increased
persistence of the output response. But for lower values of η2, the real wage
rate and employment and the real wage rate and output are no more weakly
correlated. Moreover, for η2 = 0.6, a lag between the peaks of inflation and
output response ceases to exist.
Turning to the columns regarding the calibration of fair-price setting,
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the second moments are in general not very sensitive to the elasticities of
γt. Furthermore, it is easily observable that increasing the elasticities of γt
results in a decrease of the output persistence. The main reason for the de-
crease in the output persistence is that increasing the elasticities of γt brings
about a more frequent price adjustment. Increasing the frequency of price
adjustment renders the output effect of monetary shocks low. But a realistic
lead-lag relation between inflation and output obtains only when these pa-
rameters exceed some threshold values.
3.4 Conclusions
I have presented a DSGE model featuring fair wages and fair prices as key
settings, and analyzed their implications. I have shown that the fair-price
setting combined with the fair-wage setting that allows for an intertemporal
link in real wages can generate a delayed inflation response that is hump-
shaped and lags the output response. Thus, the results suggest that the
model can explain the observed lead-lag relation between inflation and out-
put.
Because of their profound implications, fair wages and fair prices require
much more research both on macro and micro levels. As is pointed out by
Akerlof (2007), a rigorous microfoundation of each setting will explain many
puzzling facts that researcher and policy makers try to understand. On the
macro level, incorporating fair prices with other forms of fair wages or in
general with other forms of labor-market frictions is likely to yield significant
insights. Incorporating fair wages with other forms of state depending price
setting, such as the one developed by Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), may
also have interesting implications for the way aggregate shocks propagate.
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Appendix to Chapter 3:
Allowing for Investment Dynamics
In this appendix, I present the results for another variant of my model:
the baseline model extended to allow for investment and investment specific
features. As the reader may wonder how investment and the related speci-
fications are modeled, I first provide a brief explanation of the steps I have
undertaken by extending my model. Then, by means of impulse-response
and cross-correlation functions, I show that allowing for investment dynam-
ics does not bring about a significant change in the results reported in the
main text.
A 3.1 Adding Investment to the Baseline Model
I assume that households own the capital stock. The dynamics of the capital
stock Kjt of household j are given by
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)Kjt +
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
Ijt , (A 3.1)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the rate of depreciation, S(·) is a function determining in-
vestment adjustment costs, Ijt denotes investment. Utilizing a fraction of u
J
t
of capital stock entails A(ujt)Kjt units of cost. Both functions, A(·) and S(·),
are increasing and convex. Furthermore, I assume A(u) = S(1) = S ′(1) = 0,
so that the steady state of the model does not depend on variable capacity
utilization and investment adjustment costs. The reason of incorporating
these two settings into my model is as follows. As is widely known, in the
absence of capital adjustment costs, investment (consumption) become too
volatile (smooth) in response to shocks. Hence, the cost of capital adjustment
smooths investment. It is also known that nominal stickiness alone does not
generate realistic output persistence in response to monetary shocks (Ball
and Romer 1990 and Chari et al. 2000). Christiano et al. (2005) and Dotsey
and King (2006) show that introducing variable capital utilization into a New
Keynesian model overcomes the critique of Chari et al. (2000). I followed
Christiano et al. (2005) in characterizing these two settings.
The period-t budget constraint is given by
R−1t B
j
t +M
j
t
Pt
+Cjt+I
j
t+A(ujt)Kjt =
Bjt−1 +M
j
t−1 + T
j
t
Pt
+rtu
j
tK
j
t+w
j
tN
j
t+Φ
j
t ,
(A 3.2)
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where rtu
j
tK
j
t is the income from renting capital services.
Let µt denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capital accumu-
lation constraint for households’ utility maximization problem (cf. equation
3.1). The first order conditions with respect to Kjt+1, u
J
t , investment I
j
t are
given by
µt = βEt
[
λt+1
(
rt+1u
j
t+1 +A(ujt+1)
)]
+ β(1− δ)Et [µt+1] , (A 3.3)
A′(ujt) = rt, (A 3.4)
λt = µt
(
1− S
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
)
− I
j
t
Ijt−1
S ′
(
Ijt
Ijt−1
))
+
+βEt
µt+1(Ijt+1
Ijt
)2
S ′
(
Ijt+1
Ijt
) . (A 3.5)
The production technology for intermediate goods is given by
yt(z) = AtKt(z)
α (et(z)Nt(z))
1−α , (A 3.6)
where α is the share of capital, Kt(z) is the capital services rented from the
households. The rental rate of capital, rt, is determined in an economy wide
spot market.15 Cost minimization problem of firms can be stated as
min
Kt(z),Nt(z),wt(z),et(z)
rtKt(z) + wt(z)Nt(z)
s.t. yt(z) ≤ Kt(z)α (et(z)Nt(z))1−α ,
ezt = φ0 + φ1 logwt(z) + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logwt−1.
Letting mct(z) denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the demand
constraint, the first order conditions for the production unit can be written
as
rt = αmct(z)
yt(z)
Kt(z)
, (A 3.7)
wt(z) = (1− α)mct(z) yt(z)
Nt(z)
, (A 3.8)
15This is a standard assumption in the New Keynesian literature, meaning that capital
is homogenous across firms (See, for example, King and Watson 1996 and Yun 1996).
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Nt(z) = (1− α)mct(z)yt(z)
et(z)
φ1
wt(z)
. (A 3.9)
The last two conditions and (A 3.6) replace equations (3.11), (3.13) and
(3.14) of the baseline model. Thus, in the extended model, we have 6 addi-
tional variables, Kt(z), K
j
t+1, u
J
t , I
j
t , rt, and µt+1 and 6 additional conditions,
(A 3.1), (A 3.3), (A 3.4), (A 3.5), (A 3.7), and∫ 1
0
Kt(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
ujtK
j
t dj. (A 3.10)
The last one is the market clearing condition for capital services. My ex-
tension of the baseline model requires also a modification in the resource
constraint:∫ 1
0
yt(z)dz = st
∫ 1
0
(
Cjt + I
j
t +A(ujt)Kjt
)
dj (A 3.11)
Corresponding parameters of the extended model are calibrated as fol-
lows. I set α = 1/3, implying a capital share of 33%. I set δ = 0.0241,
implying an annual rate of depreciation 10%. These are the standard val-
ues used in the business-cycle literature. Calibration of the elasticity of
capital utilization, A′′(u)/A′(u), and the parameter governing the degree of
investment adjustment costs, S ′′(1), are based on Christiano et al. (2005):
A′′(u)/A′(u) = 0.01 and S ′′(1) = 1.89.
A 3.2 Simulation Results for the Extended Model
Figure A 3.1 depicts the cross-correlations of the output with the leads and
lags of inflation. The line marked with a diamond sign corresponds to the
correlations in the US output and inflation data from 1959:1 to 2006:4, both
HP-filtered. As does the baseline model, my extended model (line marked
with a square sign) resemble the shape of the cross-correlation function im-
plied by data.
Figure A 3.2 presents the impulse response functions of the extended
model and its variants for a monetary shock. The variants are chosen as in
the main text. A brief description of the impulse response functions for my
extended model is as follows. First, all key variables respond in a hump-
shaped fashion to a monetary impulse. Second, the increase in consumption
falls short of that in investment. Third employment closely tracks output.
Fourth, the real wage response is small and positive. Fifth, both models
imply a liquidity effect. Sixth, inflation follows output with a lag of two
quarters.
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Figure A 3.1: Dynamic cross-correlations: output(t), inflation(t+k)
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Note: The figure plots the cross-correlations of the output with the leads and lags of infla-
tion. The horizontal axis measures k (leads/lags). The vertical axis measures the cross-
correlations.
The implications of the variants of the extended model is rather similar
to that of the baseline model (cf. Figure 3.2). The fair-wage setting dampens
the responses of the real wage rate, marginal cost, and inflation, and magni-
fies the responses of output, consumption, investment, employment, and the
nominal interest rate. The fair-price setting smooths the responses of the
macroeconomic aggregates.
Hence, it is a plausible conclusion that the main results of Chapter 3 hold
also under a more general framework.
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Figure A 3.2: Impulse Response Functions for a Monetary Shock
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Note: The figure plots the responses of key variables to a unit standard-deviation positive shock to money growth rate. The horizontal axis
measures quarters. The vertical axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
Chapter 4
Capital Mobility & Labor
Market Volatility
A question widely discussed among academics and politicians is whether the
increase in capital mobility that has taken place since the mid-1980s has
given rise to more labor market volatility and job uncertainty (Scheve and
Slaughter 2004).1 This question is of central importance because the burden
of adjustment that labor has to bear in the wake of macroeconomic fluc-
tuations should increase when capital is internationally highly mobile while
labor is not. In consequence, the recent increases in capital mobility may
have resulted in an asymmetric distribution of the benefits and losses from
globalization among mobile capital and immobile labor. Inflexibilities and
frictions in labor markets that are beleaguered by structural unemployment
have the power to reinforce this asymmetric distribution of the benefits and
losses from globalization. In consequence, the potentially complex interac-
tion of capital mobility and labor market frictions is likely to be one key
determinant of the extent to which people are willing to accept the economic
and social changes brought about by the globalization of the world’s economy.
I use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to analyze
whether and, if so, to which extent capital mobility increases labor market
volatility. My DSGE model builds on the two-country general equilibrium
models developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Betts and Devereux
(2000, 2001), which have become the prototype models for analyzing macroe-
conomic dynamics in open economies. Their models feature aWalrasian labor
market in which wages adjust rapidly, households are always on their labor
supply schedule, and structural unemployment is absent. To account for the
1The material in this chapter is based on my joint work “Capital Mobility and Labor
Market Volatility” with Christian Pierdzioch, mimeo, (2007).
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stylized facts of real-world labor markets, I develop an extended model that
features a non-Walrasian labor market. My extended model can explain the
existence of structural unemployment, the empirically observed volatilities of
employment and real wages relative to output, the low correlation between
real wages and employment, and the high variability of employment relative
to that of real wages.
In order to model a non-Walrasian labor market, I extend my DSGE
model to incorporate fair wages. The analysis of the implications of fair wages
for the properties of DSGE models has a long tradition in macroeconomic re-
search (Danthine and Donaldson 1990). My approach to introduce efficiency
wages into my DSGE model builds on the recent contributions of Collard and
de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004). They have extended
dynamic general equilibrium models to incorporate the so-called ”gift ex-
change” efficiency-wage theory that traces back to Akerlof (1982). The ”gift
exchange” efficiency-wage theory stipulates that workers dislike effort. Work-
ers are willing to provide effort beyond some reference level of effort (the gift
of workers) if they feel that their firm treats them well. Firms, in turn, seek
to motivate workers by offering a wage above the market-clearing wage (the
gift of the firm). The optimizing behavior of workers and firms results in
structural unemployment.
I report that, in a model featuring fair wages, capital mobility magnifies
the response of employment and the real wage in the immediate aftermath of
productivity shocks and monetary shocks. At the same time capital mobility
dampens the medium run effects of productivity shocks and monetary shocks
on employment and the real wage. As a result, the overall effect of capital
mobility on the volatility of employment and the real wage, and on their
cyclical properties is moderate. My results regarding the effects of capital
mobility on the volatilities of key macroeconomic variables is reminiscent of
a famous result derived by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), who shows that allo-
cations in an endowment economy may be identical under complete markets
and financial autarchy.
My results are consistent with recent empirical evidence reported by
Razin and Rose (1994), who have found no significant empirical link between
financial openness and macroeconomic volatility. In contrast, using a search-
theoretic model, Aziarides and Pissarides (2007) have reported that capital
mobility may result in more labor market volatility. Buch and Pierdzioch
(2005) and Buch et al. (2005) have reported that the link between capital
mobility and macroeconomic volatility in OECD countries has changed over
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time and may depend on the nature of shocks hitting an economy. Similarly,
Kose et al. (2003) have found that capital mobility may be associated with
an increase in the ratio of consumption volatility to income volatility, but
that this effect turns negative if the volume of gross capital flows crosses a
particular threshold. Recent empirical evidence, thus, yields the result that
capital mobility need not necessarily increase macroeconomic volatility. This
result is consistent with the observation that in the United States and other
Western countries business-cycle volatility and employment volatility have
tended to decrease since the mid 1980s (Stock and Watson 2002, Carlino et
al. 2003).
I organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. In Section 4.1, I lay
out the DSGE model I used to derive my results. The basic structure of
my model resembles the structures of the models developed by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995) and Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001), so that my discussion
can be relatively brief. In Section 4.2, I report the results of numerical sim-
ulations of my model. In Section 4.3, I offer some concluding remarks.
4.1 The Model
The world consists of two countries. Both countries are populated by a con-
tinuum of infinitely lived households. Households form rational expectations.
Domestic and foreign households have identical preferences. Households are
internationally immobile. Households own the firms of the country in which
they reside. Firms sell the differentiated goods they produce in a monopo-
listically competitive goods market. Some firms set the prices of their goods
in the currency of the country in which they reside. Other firms set the
prices of their goods in the currency of their customers. I call the latter a
pricing-to-market (PTM) price-setting strategy (Betts and Devereux 2000,
2001). In addition to households and firms, every country is populated by a
government.
4.1.1 Households
Each household consists of a large number of household members of total
measure unity. Some members of households are unemployed, while the oth-
ers are employed. Following Alexopoulos (2004) and Danthine and Kurmann
(2004), employment is randomly allocated across workers. The proportion
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of unemployed household members is the same across households. House-
holds make all intertemporal decisions, and redistribute consumption equally
among their members. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of time
for work, and has preferences defined over consumption, real balances, and
effort. The expected discounted lifetime utility of a representative household
is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
log(Cjt −Xjt ) + χ1− σm
(
M jt
Pt
)1−σm
−N jt G(ejt)
 , (4.1)
with j being the household index and 0 < β < 1, χ > 0, and σm > 0.
Et denotes the conditional expectations operator, Nt denotes the propor-
tion of household members working, G(et) denotes the disutility of effort,
Mt/Pt denotes real money holdings, and Ct denotes a real consumption index.
This consumption index, Ct =
[∫ 1
0
ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
, is defined as a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution index of differentiated goods, ct(z), z ∈ [0, 1], where
the elasticity of substitution is given by θ > 1 . The consumer price index,
Pt, is defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of Ct.
The consumer price index is defined as
Pt =
[∫ n
0
pt(z)
1−θdz +
∫ n+(1−n)ξ
n
qt(z
∗)1−θdz +
+
∫ 1
n+(1−n)ξ
(Stp
∗(z∗))1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
, (4.2)
where n ∈ (0, 1) denotes the size of the domestic country, pt(z) denotes
the domestic currency price of a domestically produced good, qt(z
∗) denotes
the domestic currency price of a foreign PTM good, St denotes the nominal
exchange rate, and p∗t (z
∗) denotes the foreign currency price of a foreign non-
PTM good. The parameter ξ denotes the proportion of firms that follow a
PTM strategy. The domestic demand for good z for consumption purposes
is given by
ct(z) = (pt(z)/Pt)
−θ Ct. (4.3)
Households do not only derive utility from consuming the consumption
index, Cjt , but also derive disutility from the variable X
j
t . This variable
captures a ”catching-up with the Joneses” effect in households’ preferences.
It is defined as
Xjt = hC
A
t−1, (4.4)
4.1 The Model 65
where 0 < h < 1, and CAt = denotes aggregate (per capita) consumption.
An increase in the level of aggregate consumption results in a decrease in
the level of utility a household attains, and in an increase in the marginal
utility a household derives from consumption, implying that households try
to ”catch up with the Joneses”.
The disutility a household derives from effort is determined by an effort
function, G(ejt). Four considerations matter for the specification of the effort
function (Collard and de la Croix 2000, Danthine and Kurmann 2004). First,
if a firm pays a higher real wage, households are motivated and work harder.
For this reason, their reference level of effort is an increasing function of the
individual households’ current real wage, wjt . Second, if the aggregate level
of employment is high, households realize that they can easily find a new
employment opportunity in case they lose their job. Hence, the reference
level of effort is a decreasing function of the aggregate level of employment,
Nt. Third, if the real wage received by a household does not change when the
aggregate real wage increases, individual households’ relative compensation
decreases. Because households perceive this to be unfair, they decrease the
level of effort they provide. This implies that the reference level of effort is
a decreasing function of the aggregate real wage, wt. Fourth, if households
observe changes in real wages from one period to the next, they adjust their
reference level of effort. This captures the empirical finding reported by
Bewley (1998) that changes in wages rather than wage levels are an important
determinant of effort. Accordingly, the reference level of effort is a decreasing
function of an individual households’ past wage, wjt−1. Taken together, these
four considerations imply that the effort function is of a form
G(ejt) =
[
ejt −
(
φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1
)]2
, (4.5)
where φ1 > 1, φ2 < 0, φ3 < 0, and φ4 < 0.
4.1.2 Budget Constraint and First-Order Conditions
Households maximize their expected discounted lifetime utility subject to
their budget constraint. According to households budget constraint, the
total income received by households consists of the yield on their holdings in
bonds, the profit income yielded by their ownership of domestic firms, their
labor income, and their income from renting capital to domestic firms. Given
their total income, households determine their optimal consumption, effort,
investment, and next period’s capital stock. Households also decide on their
preferred holdings in domestic money and bonds. The individual households’
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budget constraint is given by
Djt = Rt−1D
j
t−1 +M
j
t−1 −M jt + wjtN jt Pt +Rkt kjtPt +
−CjtPt − IjtPt − ACjtPt + ΦjtPt + TtPt, (4.6)
whereDt denotes the quantity of domestic nominal riskless one-period bonds,
Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate on bonds, R
k
t denotes the real
rental rate of capital, Tt denotes real lump-sum transfers received from the
government, It denotes real investment, ACt is the real adjustment cost
households incur when adjusting their capital stock, and Φt denotes the real
profit income the household receives from domestic firms. The law of motion
of households’ capital stock, kjt , is given by
Ijt = k
j
t+1 − (1− δ)kjt , (4.7)
where 0 < δ < 1 denotes the depreciation rate. The investment good,
It, is constructed in the same way as the consumption index, i.e. It =[∫ 1
0
it(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
. Thus, the domestic demand for good z for investment
purposes, it(z), can be expressed by
it(z) = (pt(z)/Pt)
−θ It. (4.8)
The adjustment cost households incur when adjusting their capital stock are
given by
ACjt =
ψ
2
(kjt+1 − kjt )2
kjt
, (4.9)
where ψ ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions that describe the solution to an individual
households’ utility-maximization problem are given by
Cjt −Xjt = λtPt, (4.10)
χ
(
M jt
Pt
)−σm
= λtPt − βPtEtλt+1, (4.11)
λt = βRtEtλt+1, (4.12)
ejt = φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1, (4.13)
λtPt + β(1− δ)Etλt+1Pt+1 + βEtRkt+1λt+1Pt+1 +
+
ψ
2
βEtλt+1Pt+1
(kjt+2)
2 − (kjt+1)2
(kjt+1)
2
= ψλtPt
kjt+1 − kjt
kjt
(4.14)
4.1 The Model 67
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the households’ budget con-
straint.
4.1.3 Financial Markets
As regards the structure of international financial markets, I consider two
polar cases. First, I consider the case of a world economy in which agents
can trade in integrated financial markets for riskless one-period nominal
bonds. For simplicity, I assume that domestic households invest in a home-
currency denominated nominal bond, and that foreign households invest in
a foreign-currency denominated nominal bond and a home-currency denom-
inated nominal bond. This assumption implies that, in the case of an inte-
grated international bond market, the condition of uncovered interest-rate
parity holds. Second, I consider the case of a world economy in which
markets for trade in international assets do not exist (Cole and Obstfeld
1991, Heathcote and Perri 2002). In this case, home households invest in
a home-currency denominated nominal bond, and foreign households invest
in a foreign-currency denominated nominal bond. The market-clearing con-
dition for the home-currency denominated nominal bond in the case of an
integrated international bond market is given by∫
j
Djtdj +
∫
j
Dj∗t dj = 0 (4.15)
and the market-clearing conditions in the case of financial autarchy are given
by ∫
j
Djtdj = 0 (4.16)
and ∫
j
F j∗t dj = 0 (4.17)
where F j∗t denotes the foreign-currency denominated bond.
4.1.4 Firms
Each firm consists of a production and a price-setting unit. The production
unit produces the good, z, according to the production function
yt(z) = Atkt(z)
α[et(z)Nt(z)]
1−α, (4.18)
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where At denotes an aggregate productivity shock. Given the level of effort
provided by households, the production unit determines the real wage and
chooses the level of capital and employment in order to minimize total pro-
duction costs. Following Danthine and Kurmann (2004), I assume that the
production unit replaces the individual households’ past wage, wjt−1 , with
the aggregate past wage wt−1 in the effort function when minimizing total
production costs. Because firms treat as exogenous when minimizing total
production costs, this assumption implies that they do not account for the
consequences of offering a higher wage today for the future effort of house-
holds. In technical terms, this assumption implies that the production unit
solves a static wage-setting problem. Hence, the production unit does not
have to store information on the distribution of past wages of its employees.
In economic terms, this assumption implies that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
all firms will pay identical wages. Using in the effort function, the first-order
conditions for the cost-minimization problem are given by
wt(z) = (1− α)mct(z) yt(z)
nt(z)
, (4.19)
nt(z) = (1− α)mct(z) φ1yt(z)
et(z)wt(z)
, (4.20)
Rkt (z) = αmct(z)
yt(z)
kt(z)
, (4.21)
where mct(z) denotes the real marginal cost of production. The first-order
conditions imply et(z) = φ1, a condition known as the Solow (1979) condition.
Because of monopolistic competition in the goods market, the price-
setting unit can set the price of the good produced by the production unit in
order to maximize profits. I let q∗t (z) denote the foreign-currency price of a
domestic PTM good, and yDt (z) and y
F
t (z) denote the demand at home and
abroad. The demand functions are given by
yDt (z) = (pt(z)/Pt)
−θQt, (4.22)
yFt (z) = (q
∗
t (z)/P
∗
t )
−θQ∗t , (4.23)
Qt = n(Ct + It + ACt) and Q
∗
t = (1 − n)(C∗t + I∗t + AC∗t ). The price-
setting unit sets the price of the good subject to a discrete time version of
the price-setting mechanism developed by Calvo (1983). With probability
0 < γ < 1 , the price-setting unit cannot revise the price of its good in any
given period of time. Therefore, the price-setting unit of a PTM firm sets the
current domestic-currency and foreign-currency prices of the product, pt(z)
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and q∗t (z), so as to maximize the expected discounted present value profits.
The solutions to this maximization problem are
pt(z) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Qs/P−θs )mcs(z)
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Qs/P 1−θs )
, (4.24)
q∗t (z) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Q∗s/P
∗−θ
s )mcs(z)
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Q∗s/P ∗1−θs )Ss
, (4.25)
where Rt,s ≡
∏t
j=sR
−1
t is the market discount factor. Similar expressions
can be derived for the profit-maximizing prices, qt(z
∗) and p∗t (z
∗), set by
the price-setting units of foreign PTM firms, and for the profit-maximizing
price set by the price-setting units of non-PTM firms. The latter set a single
domestic currency denominated price for both the domestic and foreign goods
market.
4.1.5 The Government Sector
The government sector consists of a single central bank and a fiscal authority.
The central bank controls the money supply. The budget constraint of the
fiscal authority is given by
PtTt =Mt −Mt−1. (4.26)
4.1.6 Solution and Calibration of the Model
I log-linearized my model around a symmetric flexible-price steady state in
which bond holdings in the domestic and foreign country are zero. I then
simulated the calibrated model using the algorithm developed by McCallum
(1998) and Klein (2000). The calibrated parameter values are summarized
in Table 4.1.
I calibrate the model to match quarterly data. I assume that the do-
mestic and foreign countries are of equal size (n = 0.5). With regard to
households’ preferences, I assume β = 0.99, implying an annual real interest
rate of approximately 4.1 percent. I followed Sutherland (1996) and Senay
(1998) in assuming σm = 9, an assumption consistent with the calibration
used by Hairault and Portier (1993). As regards the parameter that cap-
tures the ”catching-up with the Joneses” effect in households’ preferences, I
use the numerical values used by Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and set h = 0.8.
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Table 4.1: Calibrated Parameters
Country size n = 0.5
Discount factor: β = 1.04−1/4
Semi elasticity of money demand: σm = 9
Degree of habit formation:; h = 0.8
Elasticity of real wage w.r.t.
a)employment: η1 ≡ −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.03
b)past real wage: η2 ≡ −φ4/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.99
Demand elasticity: θ = 11
Capital share: α = 0.36
Reset probability: 1− γ = 0.25
Capital adjustment costs: ψ = 21.5
Proportion of PTM firms ξ = 0.95
Risk premium Ψ = 0.004
With regard to the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods,
I assume θ = 11 , which is common in the literature. The value I chose for
θ implies a steady-state markup of prices over marginal costs of 10 percent.
As regards the depreciation rate, I assume δ = 0.024, implying an annual de-
preciation rate of 10 percent. The capital share parameter in the production
function assumes the value α = 0.36. These are typical estimates of U.S.
data. I calibrate the Calvo-pricing parameter such that the average delay
between price adjustments is four periods (γ = 0.75), a value roughly the
same as the one in Danthine and Kurmann (2004). I resort to the empirical
estimates that have recently been reported by Bergin (2006) to calibrate the
adjustment costs households’ incur when adjusting their capital stock. Ac-
cordingly, I assume ψ = 21.5. Following again Bergin (2006), I assume that
the proportion of firms that follow a PTM price-setting strategy is relatively
large. I set ξ = 0.95.
In order to calibrate the parameters of the effort function, I first derive the
fair-wage function. The fair-wage function obtains when the Solow condition,
et = φ1, is used in the effort function. Apart from a constant, the fair-wage
function, in a symmetric equilibrium, is given by
logwt = η1 logNt + η2 logwt−1, (4.27)
where η1 = −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) and η2 = −φ4/(φ1 + φ3). Danthine and Kurmann
(2004) have reported the estimates η1 = 0.03 and η2 = 0.99 for the United
States. Because the parameters of the fair-wage function are key parameters
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of my model, I shall present in Section 4.2 simulation results that I obtain
when I use alternative numerical values for the parameters of the fair-wage
function to calibrate my model.
With regard to the stochastic processes that describe the dynamics of
domestic and foreign productivity, I follow Backus et al. (1992) in specifying
the following bivariate autoregressive model:(
Aˆt
Aˆ∗t
)
=
(
0.906 0.088
0.088 0.906
)(
Aˆt−1
Aˆ∗t−1
)
+
(
εAˆt
εAˆ
∗
t
)
, (4.28)
where a hat over a variable denotes deviations from the steady state. The
standard deviations of the disturbance terms are given by σεAˆ = σεAˆ∗ =
0.00852. The coefficient of correlation between the disturbance terms is 0.258.
Similar to Chari et al. (2002), I calibrate the stochastic processes that
describe the dynamics of domestic and foreign monetary shocks(
Mˆt
Mˆ∗t
)
=
(
0.68 0
0 0.68
)(
Mˆt−1
Mˆ∗t−1
)
+
(
εMˆt
εMˆ
∗
t
)
. (4.29)
The standard deviations of the disturbance terms are given by σεMˆ = σεMˆ∗ =
0.009 as in Kollmann (2001). The coefficient of correlation between the dis-
turbance terms is 0.3, which is in between the correlations used by Kollmann
(2001) and Chari et al. (2002).
Finally, I use a risk premium to ensure the stationarity of the steady
state in the case of integrated international bond markets. If I had not
added a risk premium, productivity shocks and monetary shocks would have
resulted in permanent changes in countries’ bond positions because of the
incompleteness of asset markets in my model. Following Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003), Bergin (2006), and others, I extend the condition of uncovered
interest rate parity implied by my model by a (linearized) risk premium that
is proportional to holdings in bonds, ΨDˆt, where I set Ψ = 0.004, based on
the empirical estimates reported by Bergin (2006).
4.2 Simulation Results
I present my simulations results in three steps. In a first step, I compare the
labor market statistics implied by my model with key labor market statistics
of the United States. In a second step, I present impulse response functions
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to graphically illustrate the mechanics of my model. In a third step, I report
results of stochastic simulations that show how key labor market statistics
change in the wake of financial market integration.
4.2.1 A Comparison of the Model with the Data
Table 4.2 summarizes key labor market statistics. I focus on the standard
deviation of employment relative to that of output, the standard deviation of
the real wage relative to that of output, and the contemporaneous correlation
of employment and output, the real wage and output, and the real wage and
employment.
In addition to the statistics for a model featuring fair wages, I report
labor market statistics implied by a model that features a Walrasian labor
market. In order to simulate the model with a Walrasian labor market, I re-
placed Equation (4.13) with the standard first-order condition Nt = wtλtPt.
Finally, I report labor market statistics implied by a model featuring fair
wages and, in addition, complete international asset markets. Complete in-
ternational asset markets imply optimal international risk sharing. Optimal
international risk sharing, in turn, implies that, in every state of nature, the
ratio of the levels of domestic and foreign consumption is proportional to the
real exchange rate, (λtPt)/(λ
∗
tP
∗
t ) = ϕ(StP
∗
t /Pt), where ϕ is a constant that
reflects initial conditions. The labor market statistics implied by the three
models are based on 1,000 simulations of every one of the three models, where
every simulation has a length of 25 years of quarterly data (i.e., 100 periods).
The simulation results show that the labor market statistics implied by
the model featuring fair wages closely resemble key labor market statistics of
the United States. The model performs well in the volatilities of employment
and the real wage relative to output, their correlation, and their comovement
with output. The model does a better job in explaining the empirical labor
market statistics than a model that features a Walrasian labor market.
It is also evident from the simulation results that the model featuring
integrated international bond markets yields simulation results close to the
simulation results implied by a model featuring complete international as-
set markets. This is what one would have expected, given my assumption
that productivity shocks and monetary shocks are temporary. Baxter and
Crucini (1995) have reported that the differences between a model featur-
ing integrated international bond markets and complete international asset
markets are small if shocks are temporary.
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Table 4.2: Labor Market Statistics
Statistic US Data Model with Model without Model with Fair Wages
Fair Wages Fair Wages and Complete Asset Markets
σNt/σYt 0.81 0.80 0.29 0.80
σwt/σYt 0.69 0.49 0.94 0.49
ρNt,Yt 0.82 0.86 0.46 0.87
ρwt,Yt 0.57 0.59 0.95 0.58
ρwt,Nt 0.27 0.18 0.56 0.18
Note: The statistic σNt/σYt denotes the standard deviation of employment relative to the
standard deviation of output. The statistic σwt/σYt denotes the standard deviation of the
real wage relative to the standard deviation of output. The statistic ρNt,Yt denotes the
coefficient of correlation between employment and output. The statistic ρwt,Yt denotes the
coefficient of correlation between the real wage and output. The statistic ρwt,Nt denotes
the coefficient of correlation between the real wage and employment. Statistics for U.S.
data were taken from Krause and Lubik (2006).
4.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
In order to illustrate how fair wages affect the propagation of productiv-
ity shocks and monetary shocks, I computed impulse response functions.
The impulse response functions I shall report describe the dynamics of key
macroeconomic variables in the aftermath of a shock in terms of percentage
deviations form the steady state. I computed impulse response functions for
four cases. Case 1 represents the case of fair wages and capital mobility.
Case 2 represents the case of fair wages and financial autarchy. Case 3 rep-
resents the case of a Walrasian labor market and capital mobility. Finally,
Case 4 represents the case of a Walrasian labor market and financial autarchy.
Figure 4.1 presents impulse response functions for a domestic productiv-
ity shock. A productivity shock increases the marginal product of capital
and labor. Accordingly, firms’ demand for capital and labor increases, and
they are willing to pay a higher real wage. Firms’ investment and the real
interest rate increase. The effect of a productivity shock on the real wage
is much smaller in a model featuring fair wages than in a model featuring
a Walrasian labor market. Given households’ effort function, the real wage
adjusts only sluggishly.
As compared to the effect of a productivity shock on real wages, the effect
on employment is large. Thus, the assumption of fair wages implies, in line
with the stylized facts characterizing business cycles in many industrialized
countries, that the volatility of the real wage is smaller than the volatility
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Figure 4.1: Productivity Shock, Fair Wages, and Financial Market Integration
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Note: The figure plots the responses of domestic variables to a unit standard-deviation positive domestic productivity shock.
The horizontal axis measures quarters. The vertical axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
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of employment. Moreover, the contemporaneous correlation of the real wage
with employment is relatively low. In addition, a comparison of the response
of the real wage to a productivity shock with that of output shows that the
real wage is moderately procyclical. Moreover, the sluggish procyclical ad-
justment of the real wage increases the scope for output and employment to
expand, and for the prices of differentiated products to contract (not shown).
As a result, the ensuing expansion of output is larger in a model featuring
fair wages than in a model featuring a Walrasian labor market.
Consumption increases gradually because of the ”catching-up with the
Joneses” effect in households’ preferences. A direct consequence of the in-
crease in consumption is that the demand for domestic currency increases,
giving rise to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Because the in-
crease in consumption is stronger if the model features a non-Walrasian labor
market, the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate is stronger than in a
model featuring a Walrasian labor market. Because a non-negligible propor-
tion of firms follows a PTM price-setting strategy, the condition of purchasing
power parity does not hold. As a result, the appreciation of the nominal ex-
change rate goes hand in hand with an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
In Figure 4.1, capital mobility dampens the effect of a productivity shock
on consumption. It also increases the short-run effects of a productivity shock
on output, the nominal and real exchange rates, and employment. At the
same time, capital mobility dampens the medium-run effects of such a shock
on output and employment. Thus, in order to trace out the overall effects
of changes in the degree of capital mobility on macroeconomic volatility, one
should use stochastic simulations of the model. I shall present the results of
stochastic simulations in Subsection 4.2.3.
Figure 4.2 presents impulse response functions for a monetary shock. The
liquidity effect of a monetary shock results in a decrease in the real interest
rate and an increase in investment. Consumption also increases, but only
gradually because the ”catching-up with the Joneses” effect in households’
preferences requires a gradual adjustment of consumption. The increase in
the demand for goods implies that a monetary policy shock results in an
increase in output and employment. Firms are willing to pay higher wages,
but the assumption of fair wages implies that a monetary policy shock exerts
only a small effect on real wages. As in the case of a productivity shock,
the assumption of fair wages implies that the volatility of the real wage is
smaller than the volatility of employment, and that the real wage is weakly
procyclical.
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Figure 4.2: Monetary Shock, Fair Wages, and Financial Market Integration
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Note: The figure plots the responses of domestic variables to a unit standard-deviation positive shock to domestic money growth rate.
The horizontal axis measures quarters. The vertical axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
4.2 Simulation Results 77
With regard to international capital mobility, the impulse response func-
tions shown in Figure 4.2 confirm the insights I derived from the impulse
response functions for a productivity shock. The effects of a monetary shock
on output and employment increase in the short run, but the effects are
dampened in the medium run. As in the case of a productivity shock, cal-
culation of the overall effects of changes in the degree of capital mobility
on macroeconomic volatility requires running stochastic simulations of the
model.
4.2.3 The Effect of Capital Mobility on Labor Market
Volatility
I use stochastic simulation to quantitatively analyze the effects of capital
mobility on the following labor market statistics: the volatility of employ-
ment and the real wage, their correlation, and their comovement with out-
put. To this end, I compute the relative difference (in percentage terms)
between these labor market statistics under capital mobility and under fi-
nancial autarchy. The model is simulated 1,000 times, where each simulation
had a length of 25 years. As a robustness check, the model is simulated
also for various alternative calibrations of the model. Specifically, I vary the
parameters of the effort function, η1 and η2, the proportion of firms following
a PTM price-setting strategy, ξ, the country size, n, the probability of not
adjusting goods prices, γ, and the degree of ”catching up with the Joneses”
effect in households’ preferences, h. As yet another robustness check, I set
ψ, implying that the ratio of the volatility of investment to the volatility of
output assumes a value approximately equal to the value equal to the ratio
implied by U.S. data. In order to analyze the sensitivity of my simulation
results to the specification of the processes for productivity, I set the off-
diagonal elements of the bivariate autoregressive model that describes the
dynamics of domestic and productivity equal to zero. As a final robustness
check, I compare the simulation results for a model featuring complete in-
ternational asset markets with the simulations results for a model featuring
financial autarchy.
Table 4.3 summarizes the simulation results. The relative differences be-
tween the labor market statistics under capital mobility and under financial
autarchy are fairly small. In fact, in the majority of cases, the relative differ-
ences are smaller than one percent. Only the contemporaneous correlation
of the real wage with employment increases, in the case where the average
frequency of price changes is one quarter, about twelve perc
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Table 4.3: Capital Mobility and Labor Market Statistics
Statistic σ˜Nt,Yt σ˜wt,Yt ρ˜Nt,Yt ρ˜wt,Yt ρ˜wt,Nt
Benchmark 0.39 -0.66 1.66 -2.43 -5.76
η1 = 0 0.01 0.53 0.37 -1.15 -5.36
η1 = 0.1 5.11 -2.57 6.19 -0.87 -0.87
η2 = 0.85 -0.03 -0.53 0.74 -0.14 -0.48
η2 = 0.95 0.66 -1.53 1.72 0.03 0.30
ξ = 0 2.66 -5.30 3.90 -3.60 -2.74
n = 0.25 3.39 -2.91 2.83 -0.03 8.04
γ = 0.25 -0.14 -0.57 0.79 2.29 12.02
h = 0.4 1.02 -0.73 2.07 -3.46 -7.31
ψ = 0.75 -0.10 0.13 0.14 0.65 4.27
No spillover 4.53 -5.72 3.35 10.15 5.86
Complete 2.65 -2.70 2.33 -2.51 -10.43
Note: The statistic σ˜Nt,Yt denotes the relative difference between the standard deviation of employment relative to the
standard deviation of output under capital mobility and financial autarchy. The statistic σ˜wt,Yt denotes the relative
difference between the standard deviation of the real wage relative to the standard deviation of output under capital
mobility and financial autarchy. The statistic ρ˜Nt,Yt denotes the relative difference between the coefficient of correlation
between employment and output under capital mobility and financial autarchy. The statistic ρ˜wt,Yt denotes the relative
difference between the coefficient of correlation between the real wage and output under capital mobility and financial
autarchy. The statistic ρ˜wt,Nt denotes the relative difference between the coefficient of correlation between the real
wage and employment under capital mobility and financial autarchy. The row entitled No spillover gives the respective
statistics for a comparison of a model featuring no spillover effects of technology shocks. The row entitled Complete
gives the respective statistics for a comparison of a model featuring complete international asset markets with a model
featuring financial autarchy.
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half of the relative differences have a negative sign. Moreover, the simulation
results do not change much when I assume complete international asset mar-
kets rather than trade in integrated financial markets for riskless one-period
nominal bond. Taken together, my simulation results indicate that my model
implies that capital mobility affects the propagation of shocks, but capital
mobility per se is unlikely to be a major source of labor market volatility.
4.3 Conclusions
I have extended a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to in-
corporate fair wages. I have used my model to analyze the implications of
capital mobility for labor market volatility. My results suggest that capital
mobility, in the form of international trade in financial assets, is unlikely to
give rise to a significant increase in labor market volatility.
In future research, my analysis could be extended to explore the impli-
cations of other efficiency-wage theories (Danthine and Donaldson 1990) or
other labor market frictions like, for example, labor market search (Hairault
2002) for the link between capital mobility and labor market performance in
open-economy dynamic general equilibrium models. In addition, it would be
interesting to analyze the implications for the link between capital mobility
and labor market volatility of other structures of international financial mar-
ket than the ones I have considered in this chapter. For example, Kehoe and
Perri (2002) have developed a model with endogenous incomplete interna-
tional financial markets. In their model, international loans are imperfectly
enforceable because countries can renege on their debt and suffer the conse-
quences for future borrowing.
Finally, it is important to note that I have not considered in my analysis
that capital mobility may affect unskilled workers in a different way than
skilled workers. Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) have argued that, under in-
complete markets, the costs of business cycles may be higher for unskilled
workers than for skilled workers. In a similar vein, Krusell and Smith (1999)
have pointed out that the cost of business cycles may be high for unemployed
agents with no wealth and no opportunity to insure against unemployment
risk. A reasonable hypothesis for future research, therefore, is that differ-
ences in wealth across skilled and unskilled workers give rise to differences
with regard to their access to international financial markets and, in conse-
quence, their ability to benefit from international risk sharing.
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I hope that the results I have reported in this chapter will set the stage for
further fruitful analysis of the interaction between frictions in international
financial markets and labor market frictions.
Chapter 5
Fair Wages, Financial Market
Integration, & the Fiscal
Multiplier
An important research question in international macroeconomics is how and
to which extent the recent increase in financial market integration affects the
propagation of macroeconomic policies in an open economy.1 With regard to
fiscal policy, conventional wisdom based on the basic textbook version of the
by-now classic models of Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) suggests that
the fiscal multiplier should become substantially smaller as financial mar-
kets become more integrated. The fiscal multiplier measures the accumu-
lated effect of fiscal policy on output. The textbook version of the Mundell-
Fleming model implies that an expansionary fiscal policy triggers capital
inflows which, in turn, give rise to an exchange-rate induced crowding-out
effect. Financial market integration reinforces the crowding-out effect and,
as a result, the fiscal multiplier should become smaller.
The Mundell-Fleming model was, for a long time, the standard model for
analyzing the implications of macroeconomic policies in an open economy.
In recent years, however, it has been largely replaced by the type of “new-
open-economy macroeconomic” (NOEM) models developed by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995). NOEM models are macroeconomic dynamic general equilib-
rium models with a solid microeconomic foundation. Their microeconomic
foundation renders it possible to take into account the intertemporal budget
constraint and the dynamic optimization of the private sector when analyzing
the propagation of fiscal policy in an open economy. Recently, Sutherland
(1996) and Senay (1998) have used variants of the prototype NOEM model
1Part of the material presented here is published in C¸enesiz and Pierdzioch (2008).
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developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to argue that financial market in-
tegration should diminish the output effect of fiscal policy.
In contrast to the textbook Mundell-Fleming model, most of the NOEM
models that have been analyzed in the recent literature are built on the as-
sumption that the labor market can be described in Walrasian terms. In
a Walrasian labor market, wages adjust rapidly, households are always on
their labor supply schedule, and structural unemployment is absent. As a
consequence, these models have problems to account for the stylized facts of
real-world labor markets. For example, they cannot account for the fact that
in many economies, and at almost any time, many households are unem-
ployed. Moreover, these models cannot explain the empirically observed low
correlation between real wages and employment, the high variability of em-
ployment relative to that of real wages, and the low procyclicity of real wages.
I extend the NOEM model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to
incorporate a non-Walrasian labor market. To this end, I follow Collard and
de la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004) in resorting to the fair
wage theory tracing back to the research of Akerlof (1982). According to the
“gift exchange” theory of wages, workers dislike effort. They are, however,
willing to provide effort beyond some reference level of effort (the gift of work-
ers) if they feel that their firm treats them well. In order to motivate workers
to provide a higher level of effort, firms respond to the behavior of workers
by offering a wage above the Walrasian market-clearing wage (the gift of the
firm). Thus, the assumption that wages are set according to fair-wage con-
siderations implies that the optimizing behavior of workers and firms results
in structural unemployment.
My results implies that that adding the assumption of fair wages to an
otherwise standard NOEM model has substantial implications for the effect
of financial market integration on the fiscal multiplier in an open economy. In
line with the results of recent research by Dellas et al. (2005), my fair-wage
model implies that financial market integration should increase the fiscal
multiplier. This implication of my model is in contrast to the implications of
the NOEM models used by Sutherland (1996) and Senay (1998). It is also in
contrast to the conventional wisdom derived from the basic textbook version
of the Mundell-Fleming model. The implication of my model, however, is
in line with extensions of the Mundell-Fleming model that feature real-wage
rigidities (Sachs 1980). In order to derive the implications of my fair-wage
model, I lay out in Section 5.1 the structure of my NOEM model. I report
in Section 5.2 the results of numerical simulations of my model. I report
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the results of some robustness checks in Section 5.3. I offer some concluding
remarks in Section 5.4.
5.1 The Model
The world consists of two countries of equal size. Each country is populated
by a continuum of infinitely lived utility-maximizing households. Households
form rational expectations. Firms produce differentiated traded goods that
are sold in a monopolistically competitive goods market. The only production
factor is labor. There are no transaction costs for transporting goods across
countries. With households’ preferences being the same across countries,
these assumptions imply that both the law of one price and purchasing power
parity hold.
5.1.1 Households
Households are large in the sense that they consist of a large number of house-
hold members of total measure unity. Because of fair wages, some members
of households are unemployed, while the others are employed. This implies
that households’ members are identical ex ante, but not ex post. As in Alex-
opoulos (2004) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004), however, households are
identical both ex ante and ex post because employment is randomly allocated
across workers, and the proportion of unemployed household members is the
same across households. Households make all intertemporal decisions, and
redistribute consumption equally among their members.
Households have preferences over consumption, real balances, and effort.
In my fair-wage model, households do not have preferences over leisure, im-
plying that each household would like to spend all its time for working. Thus,
each household inelastically supplies one unit of time for work. The repre-
sentative household maximizes the following intertemporal utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Cjt )1−σ−1 − 1
1− σ−1 +
χ
1− σm
(
M jt
Pt
)1−σm
−N jt G(ejt)
 , (5.1)
with j being the household index and 0 < β < 1, σ > 0, χ > 0, and σm > 0.
Et denotes the conditional expectations operator, Nt denotes the proportion
of household members working, G(et) denotes the disutility of effort, Mt/Pt
denotes real money holdings, and Ct denotes a real consumption index. The
real consumption index, Ct, is defined as the usual constant-elasticity-of-
substitution index of domestic-produced and foreign-produced differentiated
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goods ct(z), z ∈ [0, 1], where the elasticity of substitution is given by θ.
The consumer price index, Pt, is defined as the minimum expenditure re-
quired to buy one unit of Ct. The optimal consumption allocation is given
by ct(z) = [pt(z)/Pt]
−θCt, where pt(z) denotes the home-currency price of
good z. The law of one price implies pt(z) = p
∗
t (z)St, where St denotes the
nominal exchange rate and an asterisk denotes a foreign variable. Purchasing
power parity implies Pt = P
∗
t St.
The disutility households derive from effort is determined by an effort
function. In order to specify the effort function, I follow Danthine and Kur-
mann (2004). The effort function is given by
G(ejt) =
[
ejt −
(
φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1
)]2
, (5.2)
where φ1 > 1, φ2 < 0, φ3 < 0, and φ4 < 0. According to equation 5.2, house-
holds determine the level of effort they would like to provide by resorting to
some reference level of effort. The reference level of effort is an increasing
function of the individual households’ current real wage, wjt . Thus, if a firm
pays a higher real wage, it can motivate households to work harder. The
reference level of effort is a decreasing function of the aggregate level of em-
ployment, Nt. When the aggregate level of employment is high, individual
households realize that, if they lose their job because they provide a low
level of effort, the probability of finding a new job is relatively high. The
reference level of effort is a decreasing function of the aggregate real wage,
wt. If, for a given real wage received by a household, the aggregate real
wage increases, individual households’ relative compensation decreases. As a
consequence, households perceive this to be unfair, and decrease the level of
effort they provide. Finally, as in Collard and de la Croix (2000), and in line
with Akerlof (1982), the reference level of effort is a decreasing function of
an individual households’ past wage, wjt−1. This is in line with the results of
empirical research that pay-cuts hurt morale, and that changes in real wages
from one period to the next are an important determinant of effort (Bewley
1998).
5.1.2 Financial Markets
The total income received by households consists of the yield on their hold-
ings of bonds, the profit income yielded by their ownership of domestic firms
(i.e., dividend income), and their labor income. Given their total income,
households determine their optimal consumption and decide on their pre-
ferred holdings in bonds. The individual households’ budget constraint is
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given by
Djt = Rt−1D
j
t−1 +M
j
t−1 −M jt + wjtN jt Pt − CjtPt + ΦjtPt + TtPt, (5.3)
whereDt denotes the quantity of domestic nominal riskless one-period bonds,
Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate, Tt denotes real lump-sum trans-
fers received from the government, and Φjt denotes the profit income the
household receives from domestic firms.
Given the budget constraint, households maximize their intertemporal
utility function with respect to consumption, money demand, holdings in
bonds, and effort. The first-order conditions that describe the solution to an
individual households’ utility-maximization problem are given by(
Cjt
)−1/σ
= λtPt, (5.4)
χ
(
M jt
Pt
)−σm
= λtPt − βPtEtλt+1, (5.5)
λt = βRtEtλt+1, (5.6)
ejt = φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1, (5.7)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the households’ budget con-
straint.
In order to study the implications of financial market integration for
macroeconomic dynamics, consider two cases: the case of a world economy
in which agents can trade in integrated financial markets for riskless one-
period nominal bonds, and the case of a world economy in which markets for
trade in international assets do not exist. The latter case of a world econ-
omy consisting of financially autarchic countries has been studied by Cole
and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2002). In the case of financial
autarchy, households can only trade the bonds of the country in which they
reside. In the case of integrated financial markets, the condition of uncovered
interest rate parity holds and the market-clearing condition for the integrated
international bond market is given by∫
j
Djtdj +
∫
j
Dj∗t dj = 0. (5.8)
The market-clearing conditions in the case of financial autarchy are given by∫
j
Djtdj = 0 (5.9)
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and ∫
j
F j∗t dj = 0 (5.10)
where F j∗t denotes the foreign-currency denominated bond.
5.1.3 Firms
The production function of firms is given by y(z) = Atet(z)Nt(z), where
yt(z) denotes the output of firm z, and At denotes an aggregate productivity
shock. Given the level of effort provided by households, firms set the real
wage and choose the level of employment in order to minimize total produc-
tion costs. Firms minimize wt(z)Nt(z) subject to the production function
and households’ effort function. Following Danthine and Kurmann (2004), I
assume that firms replace the individual households past wage, wjt−1 , with
the aggregate past wage wt−1 in the effort function when minimizing total
production costs. Because firms treat wt as exogenous when minimizing total
production costs, this assumption implies that they do not account for the
consequences of offering a higher wage today for the future effort of house-
holds. The technical reason for invoking this assumption is that otherwise
firms would have to solve a dynamic wage-setting problem. To this end,
they would have to store information on the distribution of past wages of
their employees. An economic reason to justify this assumption is that, in a
symmetric equilibrium, all firms will pay identical wages. Moreover, Collard
and de la Croix (2000) have found that a model in which the effort function
features wt−1 empirically performs better than a model in which the effort
function features wjt−1 as an argument. Using wt−1 in the effort function, the
first-order conditions for a firms’ cost-minimization problem are given by
wt(z) = mct(z)
yt(z)
Nt(z)
, (5.11)
Nt(z) = mct(z)
yt(z)
et(z)
φ1
wt(z)
. (5.12)
where mct denotes the real marginal cost of production. The first-order con-
ditions imply et(z) = φ1, a condition known as the Solow (1979) condition.
Because of monopolistic competition in the goods market, firms can set
the price of the good they produce. When setting the price, they must take
into account the demand curve yt(z) = (pt(z)/Pt)
−θQt, where Qt denotes
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the total world demand. Denoting government spending by Gt, the total
world demand can be expressed by Qt = 1/2(Ct + C
∗
t + Gt + G
∗
t ). As in
Calvo (1983), firms can change in every period the price with probability
0 < 1− γ < 1. Therefore, firms set the price so as to maximize the expected
present discounted value of real profits. Letting Rt,s denote the relevant
discount factor, profit maximization implies
pt(z) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Qs/P−θs )mcs(z)
Et
∑∞
s=t γ
s−tRt,s(Qs/P 1−θs )
. (5.13)
5.1.4 The Government Sector
The government sector consists of a single central bank and a fiscal authority.
The budget constraint of the fiscal authority is given by
PtGt =Mt −Mt−1 − PtTt. (5.14)
5.1.5 Solution and Calibration of the Model
I log-linearized my model around a symmetric flexible-price steady state in
which bond holdings and government spending in the domestic and foreign
country are zero. I then simulated the calibrated model using the algorithm
developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (1998, 2001). The calibrated pa-
rameter values are summarized in Table 5.1. I calibrate the model to match
quarterly data.
Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameters
Discount factor: β = 0.99
Intertemporal elasticity Substitution: σ = 0.75
Semi elasticity of money demand: σm = 9
Elasticity of real wage w.r.t.
a)employment: η1 ≡ −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.05
b)past real wage: η2 ≡ −φ4/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.85
Demand elasticity: θ = 6
Reset probability: 1− γ = 0.5
My calibration of the model is rather standard. I assume β = 0.99, imply-
ing an annual real interest rate of approximately 4.1 percent. I also assume
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θ = 6 , which implies a steady-state markup of prices over marginal costs
of 20 percent. I calibrate the Calvo-pricing parameter such that the average
delay between price adjustments is two periods (γ = 0.5). Furthermore, I
assume σ = 0.75 and σm = 9. My calibration of these parameters follows the
calibration used by other authors who have analyzed variants of the model
developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to study the link between financial
market integration and macroeconomic dynamics (Sutherland 1996, Senay
1998).
In order to calibrate the parameters of the effort function, I first derived
the fair-wage function. The fair-wage function obtains when the Solow con-
dition is used in the effort function. Apart from a constant, the fair-wage
function, in a symmetric equilibrium, is given by
logwt = η1 logNt + η2 logwt−1, (5.15)
where η1 = −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) and η2 = −φ4/(φ1 + φ3). Using the two-stage
least squares estimation technique described in detail in Danthine and Kur-
mann (2004), I estimated the parameters, η1 and η2, of the fair-wage function
in order to get an impression of their magnitude, and to inspect how these
parameters differ across countries. To this end, I collected quarterly data
from the International Financial Statistics CD-Rom published by the IMF
on employment, wages, and the GDP deflator for Germany, Japan, and the
United States. I used data for the sample period 1991:1 to 2004:4. In the
case of Germany, I estimated η1 = 0.05 and η2 = 0.75, in the case of Japan
I estimated η1 = 0.02 and η2 = 0.90, and in the case of the United States I
estimated η1 = 0.06 and η2 = 0.90.
Of course, my estimation results are only indicative. Using data for a
longer sample period, and implementing a more sophisticated estimation
technique would certainly yield more precise estimates of the parameters of
the fair-wage function. Yet, my estimates provide a rough idea of the likely
magnitude of the parameters of the fair-wage function. Given my estimation
results, I assume η1 = 0.05 and η2 = 0.85 for the numerically simulation of
my model. However, in order to assess the robustness of my results, I shall
present in Section 5.3 simulation results that I obtain when I use alternative
numerical values for the parameters of the fair-wage function to calibrate my
model.
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5.2 Simulation Results
In order to analyze how fair wages and financial market integration affect the
propagation of fiscal policy and the fiscal multiplier, I computed impulse re-
sponse functions. The impulse response functions I shall report describe the
dynamics of key macroeconomic variables in the aftermath of a permanent
unit shock to government spending. Thus, as in the classic Mundell-Fleming
model, I measure fiscal policy in terms of changes in government spending.
With respect to the cross-country correlation of shocks, following Sutherland
(1996), Senay (1998), and Pierdzioch (2004), I assume a perfect negative
correlation of shocks across countries, i.e., I assume that the domestic (for-
eign) country is hit by a positive (negative) unit shock. Assuming a perfect
negative correlation of shocks across countries has the advantage that the
impulse response functions in the foreign country are a mirror image of the
impulse response functions in the domestic country. The impulse response
functions for the domestic country, therefore, fully describe the macroeco-
nomic dynamics in my two-country model.
I computed impulse response functions for (1) the case of a Walrasian
labor market and financial market integration, (2) the case of fair wages and
financial market integration, (3) the case of a Walrasian labor market and
financial autarchy, and, (4) the case of fair wages and financial autarchy.
In order to compute the impulse response functions for the model featuring
a Walrasian labor market, I assume that households’ intertemporal utility
function is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Cjt )1−σ−1 − 1
1− σ−1 +
χ
1− σm
(
M jt
Pt
)1−σm
− (N
j
t )
1+φ
1 + φ
 . (5.16)
Equation (5.16) implies that households’ effort function given in equation
(5.7) must be replaced in the case of a Walrasian labor market by the first-
order condition (N jt )
φ = wjtλtPt. Utility functions similar to the one given in
equation (5.16) are standard in the literature building on the seminal work of
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Following Sutherland (1996) and Senay (1998),
I set φ = 0.4.
The impulse response functions shown in Figure 5.1 summarize the sim-
ulation results. Panel A shows the impulse response functions for the model
featuring a Walrasian labor market. Panel B shows the impulse response
functions for the model featuring fair wages. The solid (dashed) impulse
response functions represent the case of financial market integration (finan-
cial autarchy). Before focusing on the details of Figure 5.1, a short note on
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Figure 5.1: Fiscal Policy, Fair Wages, and Financial Market Integration
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Note: The figure plots the responses of domestic variables to a unit asymmetric perma-
nent shock to government spending. The horizontal axis measures quarters. The vertical
axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.The solid responses
represent the case of financial market integration. The dashed responses represent the case
of financial autarchy.
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my analysis of the effects of financial market integration on fiscal multiplier
will be convenient because it is an analysis of the change (from autarchy to
integration) in the change (stems from fiscal shock) in a variable, and, thus,
can be seemingly cumbersome. Note that the steady-state effects of fiscal
policy implied by the model featuring a Walrasian labor market differ from
the steady state effects implied by the model featuring fair wages. For this
reason, I do not directly compare the fiscal multipliers across the models
with different labor market structures. What I directly compare is the fis-
cal multipliers across the models with different financial market structures
in which the steady state effects of fiscal policy are the same. Then, under
the implicit assumption that the structure of labor market does not change
with the change in the structure of financial markets, I compare the change
(from autarchy to integration) in the fiscal multipliers across the models with
different labor market structures.
In the model featuring a Walrasian labor market (Panel A), the as-
sumed asymmetric nature of fiscal policy implies that an increase in gov-
ernment spending does not change the level of aggregate demand. How-
ever, an increase in government spending implies that the domestic fiscal
authority must cut transfers in order to keep the government budget bal-
anced. For households, the lower transfers are equivalent to a higher tax
bill. Because households seek to smooth consumption over time, they try to
dampen the effect of the higher tax bill on their budget by reducing their
holdings in bonds. For the bond market equilibrium to hold under financial
autarchy, the real interest rate must increase, implying that the short-run
fall in consumption exceeds the long-run fall in consumption. The fall in
consumption results in a lower demand for domestic currency, giving rise
to a nominal deprecation of the exchange rate. The exchange rate is given
by Sˆt = Mˆt − Mˆ∗t − (Cˆt − Cˆ∗t )/(σσm) + β(Rˆt − Rˆ∗t )/σm, where a hat over
a variable denotes percentage deviations from the steady state. Because
the prices of differentiated goods adjust sluggishly, the depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate improves the terms of trade. The terms of trade are
defined as xˆt = qˆt − qˆ∗t − Sˆt, where qˆt and qˆ∗t are indexes of the prices of
domestic-produced and foreign-produced differentiated goods. For the do-
mestic economy, I define qˆt = (1− γ)
∑∞
s=0 γ
spˆt−s(j). The movement in the
terms of trade results in an expenditure switching effect. As a result, the
demand-determined output increases. The increase in output is accompa-
nied by an increase in employment, requiring a drop in the real wage.
Under financial market integration, fiscal policy does not change the real
interest rate, implying that consumption instantaneously falls to its new
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long-run steady-state level. The fall in consumption under financial mar-
ket integration is smaller in the short run than the fall in consumption under
financial autarchy. In consequence, households enjoy a smoother intertempo-
ral consumption path under financial market integration than under financial
autarchy. Because financial market integration dampens the effect of fiscal
policy on consumption, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate under
financial market integration is smaller than the depreciation under financial
autarchy. As a result, financial market integration cushions the effect of fiscal
policy on the terms of trade and on output. For example, the fiscal multi-
plier for output over 15 quarters, i.e. the area under the output response,
decreases by 16% when one moves from financial autarchy to integrated fi-
nancial markets. In other words, as in the basic textbook version of the
Mundell-Fleming model and in the models developed by Sutherland (1996)
and Senay (1998), the fiscal multiplier under financial market integration is
smaller than the fiscal multiplier under financial autarchy in the model fea-
turing a Walrasian labor market.
Panel B of Figure 5.1 shows the impulse response functions for the model
featuring fair wages. As in the model featuring a Walrasian labor market,
fiscal policy brings about a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, an im-
provement in the terms of trade, and in increase in output and employment.
In contrast to the model featuring a Walrasian labor market, however, the
increase in employment, in line with the fair-wage function, precipitates an
increase in the real wage. According to the Solow condition, the real wage
must increase to keep the level of effort provided by workers constant. Be-
cause the lagged real wage enters into the fair-wage function, the real wage
increases gradually. In line with the results of empirical research, the impulse
response functions show that my model implies that the correlation between
the real wage and employment is low. Similarly, the variability of employ-
ment relative to that of the real wage is large.
Although the real wage adjusts sluggishly, the fact that fiscal policy re-
sults in an increase in the real wage implies that marginal costs and, therefore,
goods prices increase sharper than in the model featuring a Walrasian labor
market. As a result, the real interest rate temporarily decreases under fi-
nancial autarchy in the model featuring fair wages. The decrease in the real
interest rate implies that the fall in consumption triggered by fiscal policy is
smaller in the short run than in the long run. For bond market equilibrium
to hold under financial autarchy, the magnitude of the fall in consumption
must be larger in the model featuring fair wages than in the model featuring
a Walrasian labor market.
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As in the model featuring a Walrasian labor market, financial market in-
tegration implies that (asymmetric) fiscal policy leaves the real interest rate
unaffected. In contrast to the model featuring a Walrasian labor market,
however, the short-run fall in consumption under financial market integra-
tion exceeds the short-run fall in consumption under financial autarchy. The
result is a sharp depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and a correspond-
ing large movement in the terms of trade, employment, and output. Because
the fair-wage function implies a sluggish adjustment of the real wage, the
increase in employment is accompanied by a moderate increase in the real
wage. The increase in the real wage under financial market integration ex-
ceeds the increase in the real wage under financial autarchy. The movement
in the terms of trade, however, shows that the inflationary effect of the in-
crease in the real wage on marginal costs is not large enough to compensate
the expenditure switching effect brought about by the improvement in the
terms of trade. Thus, the assumption of fair wages gives rise to a reversal
in the effects of financial market integration on the fiscal multiplier. For
example, the fiscal multiplier for output over 15 quarters increases by 15%
(cf. 16% decrease in the model featuring a Walrasian labor market) when
one moves from financial autarchy to integrated financial markets. In other
words, financial market integration results in an increase in the fiscal multi-
plier in the model featuring fair wages.
5.3 Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of my results, I computed, for various calibra-
tions and specifications of my model, the absolute value of the accumulated
responses of key macroeconomic variables to a fiscal policy shock. I did this
for the version of my model that operates under financial market integration
and the version that operates under financial autarchy. Finally, I computed
the relative fiscal multiplier, RFM , defined as
RFM(xˆt, i) =
|∑it=0 xˆt,integration|
|∑it=0 xˆt,autarchy| , (5.17)
where xˆ denotes the macroeconomic variable being analyzed and i denotes
the horizon at which the relative fiscal multiplier is analyzed. I consider
horizons of one quarter, one year, and two years. Thus, I set i ∈ 1, 4, 8. If
RFM > 1, then the fiscal multiplier is larger under financial market integra-
tion than under financial autarchy, et vice versa.
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Table 5.2 summarizes the results. As a first robustness check, I com-
pare the results for the benchmark calibration given in Table 5.1 with the
results for a model featuring a Walrasian labor market. In order to simulate
the model featuring a Walrasian labor market, I assume that households’
intertemporal utility function is given by equation (5.16). In the benchmark
model, the relative fiscal multiplier is larger than one, implying that finan-
cial market integration results in an increase rather than a decrease in the
fiscal multiplier. The relative fiscal multipliers with regard to consumption,
employment, and the nominal exchange rate are also larger than one. In
contrast, in the model featuring a Walrasian labor market, the relative fis-
cal multipliers with regard to output, consumption, employment, and the
nominal exchange rate are smaller than one. This result illustrates the con-
ventional wisdom that the fiscal multiplier is smaller under financial market
integration than under financial autarchy.
Because the case of φ = 0.4 may be too restrictive, I also computed the
relative fiscal multiplier for a model featuring a Walrasian labor market in
which this parameter assumes the value φ = 1. This value has been used
by, for example, Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Bergin (2006). The results
show that the relative fiscal multipliers with regard to output, consumption,
employment, and the nominal exchange rate are smaller than one. The re-
sults also illustrate that in the model featuring a Walrasian labor market
the relative fiscal multipliers are increasing in the parameter φ. When this
parameter becomes large, the relative fiscal multipliers obtain values close to
unity.
As a second robustness check, I report the results I obtain when I change
the parameters of the fair-wage function to η1 = 0.1 and η2 = 0.99. In order
to analyze the implications of changes in the degree to which goods prices
are sticky, I also report results for γ = 0.75 and γ = 0.25. As in the case of
the benchmark calibration, the relative fiscal multipliers are larger than one.
As a third robustness check, I assume that households have a home-
product bias in preferences (Warnock 2003). This assumption formalizes the
idea that households prefer to consume home-produced goods over foreign-
produced goods for a given vector of relative prices. A home-product bias
in preferences implies that fiscal policy can trigger changes in the real ex-
change rate and, thus, deviations from purchasing power parity. I build a
home-product bias into households’ preferences by assuming that the home
consumption index, Ct, is defined over consumption goods produced in the
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Table 5.2: Results of Robustness Checks
Consumption Output Employment Exchange Rate
Benchmark calibration
1 quarter 1.0815 4.1089 4.1089 2.4839
1 year 1.0437 2.3652 2.3654 1.5450
2 years 1.0203 1.7239 1.7240 1.2287
Model featuring a Walrasian labor market (φ = 0.4)
1 quarter 0.9297 0.8521 0.8523 0.6219
1 year 0.9773 0.9511 0.9544 0.7873
2 years 0.9932 0.9754 0.9792 0.8704
Model featuring a Walrasian labor market (φ = 1)
1 quarter 0.9886 0.9705 0.9705 0.9146
1 year 0.9956 0.9923 0.9923 0.9645
2 years 0.9979 0.9963 0.9963 0.9817
Benchmark model with η1 = 0.1
1 quarter 1.0755 4.0185 4.0198 2.3282
1 year 1.0358 2.0210 2.0246 1.4309
2 years 1.0141 1.4952 1.5026 1.1596
Benchmark model with η2 = 0.99
1 quarter 1.0787 4.3246 4.3247 2.5207
1 year 1.0399 2.3736 2.3743 1.5373
2 years 1.0150 1.2945 1.2958 1.1996
Benchmark model with γ = 0.75
1 quarter 1.1093 4.7093 4.7092 3.3370
1 year 1.0830 3.3566 3.3896 2.1787
2 years 1.0556 2.3283 2.3657 1.6238
Benchmark model with γ = 0.25
1 quarter 1.0553 2.8580 2.8570 1.7763
1 year 1.0196 1.5689 1.5605 1.2096
2 years 1.0068 1.5390 1.5144 1.0759
Benchmark model with home-product bias, α = 1.8
1 quarter 1.0426 2.5497 2.5498 3.5282
1 year 1.0361 1.7895 1.7948 1.8361
2 years 1.0208 1.3059 1.3149 1.3161
Benchmark model with habit formation h = 0.6
1 quarter 1.0044 1.0948 1.0948 1.0781
1 year 0.9990 1.1253 1.1261 1.0371
2 years 0.9930 0.9997 1.0018 0.9744
Benchmark model with µ1 = 0, µ2 = −0.5, µ3 = −1.0
1 quarter 1.0734 3.7083 3.7080 2.3647
1 year 1.0415 2.5282 2.5242 1.6069
2 years 1.0194 1.7304 1.7244 1.2505
Benchmark model with µ1 = 0, µ2 = −1.0, µ3 = −1.0
1 quarter 1.0727 3.5276 3.5263 2.3286
1 year 1.0418 2.7020 2.6990 1.6632
2 years 1.0193 1.7464 1.7417 1.2642
Benchmark model with µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0, µ3 = −0.5
1 quarter 1.0741 3.8500 3.8709 2.3925
1 year 1.0411 2.3331 2.3566 1.5577
2 years 1.0196 1.6237 1.6552 1.2391
Blanchard-Gali real-wage rigidity (ρw = 0.9)
1 quarter 0.7585 0.4822 0.4822 0.3221
1 year 0.7719 0.6486 0.6472 0.3247
2 years 0.8368 0.789 0.7872 0.4098
Blanchard-Gali real-wage rigidity (ρw = 0.999)
1 quarter 0.7763 1.7450 1.7451 1.2117
1 year 0.7464 1.1522 1.1523 0.7982
2years 0.7297 0.9023 0.9024 0.6417
Note: In order to produce the results summarized in this table, I computed the relative
fiscal multiplier as defined in equation (5.17).
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home country, ct(z), and in the foreign country, c
∗
t (z), as follows:
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
α1/θct(z)
(θ−1)/θdz +
∫ 1
0
(2− α)1/θ(c∗t (z))(θ−1)/θdz
] θ
θ−1
, (5.18)
where α ∈ (0, 2). If α ∈ (1, 2), then households have a bias for domestically
produced goods. If α = 1, then households’ preferences do not feature a
home-product bias. If α ∈ (0, 1), then households prefer to consume goods
produced abroad over goods produced at home for a given vector of relative
prices. Equation (5.18) implies that the price index and the demand curve
are given by
Pt =
[∫ 1/2
0
αpt(z)
1−θdz +
∫ 1
1/2
(2− α)(p∗t (z))1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
, (5.19)
yt(z) = α
(
pt(z)
Pt
)−θ (
Ct +Gt
2
)
+(2−α)
(
pt(z)
StP ∗t
)−θ (
C∗t +G
∗
t
2
)
. (5.20)
I report in Table 5.2 the results for the case α = 1.8. As in the benchmark
model, the relative fiscal multipliers for output, consumption, employment,
and the nominal exchange rate are larger than one.
As a forth robustness check, I extend my model to incorporate (in-
ternal) habit formation in consumption. Habit formation in consumption
implies a smoother adjustment of consumption to a shock because house-
holds’ utility depends on both the level of consumption and the rate of
change of consumption. With habit formation in consumption, the con-
sumption part of a households’ intertemporal utility function is given by
(1−σ−1)−1(Cjt )1−σ−1(Cjt−1)−h(1−σ−1), where h is the so-called habit-formation
parameter. Under habit formation, equation 5.4 is replaced by (dropping the
household index)
(Cjt )
−σ−1(Cjt−1)
−h(1−σ−1)−βh(Cjt )−h(1−σ
−1)−1Et(C
j
t+1)
1−σ−1 = λtPt. (5.21)
Drawing on the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al.
(2005), I assume h = 0.6 when simulating a model featuring habit formation
in consumption. Habit formation in consumption reduces the relative fis-
cal multipliers, implying that the fiscal multipliers for output, consumption,
employment, and the nominal exchange rate under financial market integra-
tion are closer to those obtained under financial autarchy. I do not report
but mention that when the habit formation parameter becomes very large,
I obtain the standard Mundell-Fleming result that the fiscal multiplier with
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regard to output is smaller under financial market integration than under
financial autarchy. Thus, assuming habit formation in combination with fair
wages can have important implications with regard to the implications of
financial market integration for the propagation of fiscal policy in an open
economy.
As a fifth robustness check, I extend my model to incorporate a monetary
policy rule. I assume that the monetary policy conducted by the domestic
central bank can be described in terms of the following monetary policy rule:
Mˆt = µ1Mˆt−1 + µ2∆yˆt + µ3∆Pˆt (5.22)
where ∆ denotes the first-difference operator. A similar monetary policy rule
applies in the case of the foreign central bank. As compared to the Taylor-
style interest-rate targeting rules often discussed in the literature (Taylor
1993), the monetary policy rule given in equation (5.22) has the advan-
tage that it nests the monetary policy rules used by Sutherland (1996) and
Senay (1998) to study the implications of financial market integration for
macroeconomic dynamics. Their monetary policy rule obtains when I as-
sume µ1 ∈ [0, 1] and µ2 = µ3 = 0. Moreover, Pierdzioch (2004) has used a
similar monetary policy rule to analyze how interactions between monetary
and fiscal policy change the implications of financial market integration for
the fiscal multiplier in an open economy. Thus, it is straightforward to com-
pare my results with the results reported in the recent literature.
I report results for three monetary policy rules. With regard to the first
monetary policy rule, I assume µ1 = 0, µ2 = −0.5, and µ3 = −1. Thus,
in this first case, the central bank reacts to both a rise in inflation and a
rise in the rate of output growth. Because the central bank responds to
variations in changes in output rather than to variations in the level of out-
put, the central bank conducts what Walsh (2003) has called a ’speed limit’
policy. With regard to the second monetary policy rule, I assume µ1 = 0
and µ2 = µ3 = −0.5. In this second case, the central bank targets nominal
income (McCallum and Nelson 1999). With regard to the third monetary
policy rule, I assume µ1 = µ2 = 0 and µ3 = −1. In this third case, the cen-
tral bank adopts a strategy of a strict inflation response. In all three cases,
the relative fiscal multiplier is larger than one. When I use other values for
the parameters of my monetary policy rule, I obtain results similar to those
reported in Table5.2.
As a sixth and final robustness check, I replace my fair-wage function
given in equation (5.15) with the wage-setting model that has recently been
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proposed by Blanchard and Gali (2007). Their wage-setting model is a partial
adjustment model that explains the dynamics of the real wage in terms of an
arithmetic average of the lagged real wage and the Walrasian real wage. The
wage-setting model is given by logwt = ρw logwt−1+(1−ρw) logmrst, where
mrst denotes the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consump-
tion. Equation 5.16 implies mrst = N
φ
t C
1/σ
t . The real wage, thus, depends
on the lagged real wage and employment and, in addition, on consumption.
The fair-wage function given in equation (5.15), in contrast, implies that the
real wage depends on the lagged real wage and employment.
The results suggest that the weighting parameter, ρw, plays an important
role for the relative fiscal multiplier. If the weighting parameter assumes
the value ρw = 0.9, the relative fiscal multiplier is smaller than one, as in
the model featuring a Walrasian labor market. If, in contrast, the weighting
parameter assumes the value ρw = 0.999, the relative fiscal multiplier exceeds
one, as in the benchmark fair-wage model. The economic intuition for this
result is that, as witnessed by the impulse response functions shown in Figure
5.1, fiscal policy triggers a large response of consumption. The large response
of consumption, in turn, results in a rapid adjustment of the real wage.
Because the adjustment of the real wage is not sluggish enough in the model
proposed by Blanchard and Gali (2007), the implications of their model with
regard to the relative fiscal multiplier resemble the implications of a model
featuring a Walrasian labor market.
5.4 Conclusions
Before general policy-relevant conclusions and empirically testable hypothe-
ses can be derived from the type of analysis I have undertaken in this chapter,
much more research on the link between the structure of labor markets, fi-
nancial market integration, and the fiscal multiplier needs to be done. For ex-
ample, I have reported results for the relatively simple two-country Obstfeld-
Rogoff model. Their model has been extended in a number of dimensions
to account for the stylized facts of international business cycles. Betts and
Devereux (2000) have extended the model to incorporate pricing-to-market
of firms, and Ganelli (2003) has extended the model to incorporate useful
government spending. It would be interesting to analyze in future research
how these extensions of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model interact with fair wages in
shaping the changes in the fiscal multiplier that occur in the wake of financial
market integration.
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It is also important to note that I have focused in my analysis on one spe-
cific labor-market rigidity: the fair-wage theory. Other efficiency-wage the-
ories have been analyzed in the literature (Danthine and Donaldson 1990).
Exploring in future research the implications of other efficiency-wage theories
for the link between financial market integration and the fiscal multiplier is
likely to yield significant insights. Finally, other forms of labor-market fric-
tions than efficiency wages may have interesting implications for the way
financial market integration affects the fiscal multiplier in NOEM models.
For example, in the recent literature, theories of labor-market search have
received considerable attention. Hairault (2002) and Walsh (2005) have an-
alyzed the business-cycle implications of such theories in dynamic general
equilibrium models. The analysis of the potentially complex links between
search frictions in the labor market, financial market integration, and the
fiscal multiplier is a challenging task that awaits future research.
Chapter 6
Fair Wages & Fair Prices in an
Open Economy
In this chapter, I develop a two country dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium model to study the implications of fair wages and fair prices, the
properties of which have been detailed in the previous chapters. Particu-
larly, I embed the closed economy model of Chapter 3 to a two country
framework. This allows me to answer the question whether and, if so, to
which extent the results reported in Chapter 3 hold if international goods
and capital transactions are taken into account. It also allows me to analyze
the implications of fair wages and fair prices for the international transmis-
sion of shocks and for international asset prices (the real exchange rate).
The open economy structure of my model is akin to those recently devel-
oped by Chari et al. (2002) and Steinsson (2008). Specifically, open economy
components of my model that are absent in the standard new open economy
macroeconomic model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) are as follows. The
model features a home-product bias in preferences (Warnock 2003). This
assumption formalizes the puzzling feature of data that households prefer
to consume home-produced goods over foreign-produced goods (Obstfeld
and Rogoff 2000a). The model further features pricing-to-market (Krug-
man 1987). Under pricing-to-market, firms can tailor the prices to specific
local demand conditions, i.e., firms can engage in third degree price discrim-
ination. Finally the model features local-currency pricing (Devereux 1997).
Under local-currency pricing, exporters’ prices are denominated in the lo-
cal currency of buyers.1 These assumptions allow for deviations from the
purchasing power parity condition and, thus, for fluctuations of the real ex-
1See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) for a review of pricing-to-market and local-currency
pricing approaches.
6.1 The Model 101
change rate.
I find that the propagation of monetary and technology shocks in my
open economy model is quite similar to that in the closed economy model
of Chapter 3. My results also show that the model is capable of generating
a response of the real exchange rate to a technology shock that exhibits a
hump shaped pattern. This result confirms the findings of Steinsson (2008). I
also find that consumption and the real exchange rate dynamics significantly
change by restricting the households’ access to international asset markets.
This results contradicts the findings of previous research (Baxter and Crucini
1995, Kollmann 1996, and Schmitt-Grohe` and Uribe 2003).
I organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. I set up my model in
Section 6.1. The setup is rather minimalistic because it combines the main
features of the closed economy model of Chapter 3 with above described fea-
tures (home-bias, pricing-to-market, local-currency pricing). In Section 6.2,
I report the results of numerical simulations of my model. In Section 6.3, I
offer some concluding remarks.
6.1 The Model
The world consists of two countries of equal size. Each country is populated
by a continuum of infinitely lived utility-maximizing households. House-
holds are internationally immobile. Households form rational expectations,
and they consume, trade in complete international financial markets, hold
money, own firms, and supply labor. Households’ preferences are biased in
favor of home goods. Firms sell their differentiated consumption goods in
a monopolistically competitive goods market. Firms set the prices of their
goods in the currency of their customers, i.e. firms practice local-currency-
pricing. Moreover, firms has the exclusive right to sell their goods in the
two countries. Consequently, international differences in goods prices are
not possible to arbitrage away even though there are no transaction costs
for transporting goods across countries. Thus, firms can price-discriminate
across the countries, i.e., firms can price-to-market.
6.1.1 Households
Households are large in the sense that they consist of a large number of
workers of total measure unity. As a consequence of efficiency wage, some
members of households are unemployed. But because each household pools
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consumption, and distributes employment randomly across its members, and
because the fraction of employed household members is the same across
households, I can abstract from distributional issues. Thus, I can analyze
the model by studying the decisions taken by a representative household.
The representative household maximizes the following utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
log(Cjt − hCjt−1) + χ1− σm
(
M jt
Pt
)1−σm
−N jt G(ejt)
 , (6.1)
with j being the domestic-household index, j ∈ [0, 1], and 0 < β < 1, χ > 0,
and σm > 0. Et denotes the conditional expectations operator, Nt denotes
the proportion of household members working, G(et) denotes the disutility of
effort,Mt/Pt denotes real money holdings, and Ct denotes a real consumption
index. The disutility households derive from effort is determined by an effort
function:
G(ejt) =
[
ejt −
(
φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1
)]2
, (6.2)
where wt denotes the real wage rate and φ1 > 1, φ2 < 0, φ3 < 0, and φ4 < 0.
The period-by-period budget constraint is given by
EtΛt,t+1B
j
t+1 +M
j
t
Pt
+ Cjt =
Bjt +M
j
t−1 + T
j
t
Pt
+ wjtN
j
t + Φ
j
t , (6.3)
where Bjt denotes the state contingent payoff on household j’s financial port-
folio, and Λt,t+1 denotes a stochastic discount factor that prices B
j
t+1, Pt
denotes the consumer price index, T jt is the lump-sum transfers from the
monetary authority, and Φjt is the sum of the household’s real profit income.
To rule out Ponzi schemes, I assume that there exists a borrowing limit for
households.
The first-order conditions associated with domestic households’ utility-
maximization problem are given by(
Cjt − hCjt−1
)−1 − hβ (EtCjt+1 − hCjt )−1 = λt, (6.4)
χ
(
M jt
Pt
)−σm
= λt − βEt
[
λt+1
πt+1
]
, (6.5)
ejt = φ0 + φ1 logw
j
t + φ2 logNt + φ3 logwt + φ4 logw
j
t−1, (6.6)
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Λt,t+i = β
i
[
λt+iPt
λtPt+i
]
, (6.7)
where πt = Pt/Pt−1. A standard transversality condition holds as well.
Using a no-arbitrage argument, the (gross) nominal interests rate can be
expressed by
Rt =
1
EtΛt,t+1
. (6.8)
To derive an equation that describes the real exchange rate, it will be
convenient addressing the foreign households’ problem partially. The period-
by-period budget constraint that a foreign household faces is given by
EtΛt,t+1B
j∗
t+1
StP ∗t
+
M j∗t
P ∗t
+Cj∗t =
Bj∗t
StP ∗t
+
M j∗t−1 + T
j∗
t
P ∗t
+wj∗t N
j∗
t +Φ
j∗
t , (6.9)
with j∗ being the foreign household index, j∗ ∈ (1, 2].2 Bj∗t+1 denotes the
payoff on foreign household j∗’s financial portfolio consisting of domestic
currency denominated state contingent assets, and St denotes the nominal
exchange rate defined as the price of one unit of foreign currency in terms
domestic currency. Maximizing the foreign counterpart of (6.1) with respect
to Bj∗t+1 gives then the first order condition:
Λt,t+i
St+i
St
= βi
[
λ∗t+iP
∗
t
λ∗tP ∗t+i
]
. (6.10)
Let rt denote the real exchange rate defined as rt = StP
∗
t /Pt. Then, combin-
ing equations (6.7) and (6.10) accordingly and iterating the result backwards
to t = 0, I obtain
rt = r0
λ0
λ∗0
λ∗t
λt
. (6.11)
Hence, complete financial markets assumption implies that the real exchange
rate is given by the ratio of marginal utilities.
6.1.2 Indexes of Goods and Prices
A continuum of domestic firms indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of
foreign firms indexed by v ∈ (1, 2] operate in the international goods mar-
ket. Consumption preferences of domestic households are described by the
2For notational convenience, I use an asterisk to denote the foreign counterpart of a
variable.
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following composite consumption index of domestic and foreign bundles of
goods:
Ct =
[
χ
1/η
H C
η−1
η
H,t + χ
1/η
F C
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
, (6.12)
where η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods,
and χH > 0 and χF > 0 are the preference parameters capturing the bias for
home and foreign goods, with χH + χF = 1. Notice that χH > χF implies
domestic households’ preferences are biased towards home goods. Home
and foreign goods indexes are defined as the standard constant-elasticity-of-
substitution indexes:
CH,t =
[∫ 1
0
ct(z)
θ−1
θ dz
] θ
θ−1
(6.13)
and
CF,t =
[∫ 2
1
ct(v)
θ−1
θ dv
] θ
θ−1
, (6.14)
where θ > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods,
and ct(i) denotes the consumption goods produced by firm i. Expenditure
minimization by domestic and foreign households implies that the domestic
demand and the foreign demand for good z is given, respectively, by
ct(z) =
[
Pt(z)
PH,t
]−θ [
PH,t
Pt
]−η
χHCt, (6.15)
and
c∗t (z) =
[
P ∗t (z)
P ∗H,t
]−θ [
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
]−η
χ∗HC
∗
t , (6.16)
where Pt(z) denotes the domestic price of good z, and P
∗
t (z) denotes the
foreign price of good z. The latter is denominated in foreign currency. Ex-
penditure minimization by domestic and foreign households also implies that
the consumer price indexes are given by
Pt =
[
χHP
1−η
H,t + χFP
1−η
F,t
] 1
1−η , (6.17)
and
P ∗t =
[
χ∗HP
∗1−η
H,t + χ
∗
FP
∗1−η
F,t
] 1
1−η . (6.18)
The subindexes PH,t, P
∗
H,t, PF,t, and P
∗
F,t are defined accordingly as:
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
, P ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
P ∗t (z)
1−θdz
] 1
1−θ
,
PF,t =
[∫ 2
1
Pt(v)
1−θdv
] 1
1−θ
, and P ∗F,t =
[∫ 2
1
P ∗t (v)
1−θdv
] 1
1−θ
.
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6.1.3 Firms
To simplify the profit maximization problem of firms suppose that each firm
consists of a production unit and a pricing unit. The production technology of
firm z is given by yt(z) = Atet(z)Nt(z), where yt(z) denotes the world demand
for good z, and At denotes an aggregate technology shock to productivity.
The production unit minimizes the cost of production, wt(z)Nt(z), subject
to the constraints (i) that effort level of the workers should sustain the norm
(equation 6.6), and (ii) that the production should keep up with the demand
(yt(z) ≤ Atet(z)Nt(z)).3 Optimal choices of the labor demand and the real
wage rate by the production unit of firm z imply that Solow (1979) condition,
et(z) = φ1, holds, and
wt(z) = mct(z)
yt(z)
Nt(z)
, (6.19)
where mct(z) denotes the real marginal cost of production.
To maximize the profit of the firm, the pricing unit of firm z chooses the
prices they charge in the domestic market, Pt(z), and in the foreign market,
P ∗t (z). As in Rotemberg (2005), the pricing unit can change the domestic
price in every period with probability 0 < 1− γH,t < 1 and the foreign price
in every period with 0 < 1− γ∗H,t < 1. In denotation of these probabilities, I
use country indexes because these probabilities depend on the states of the
corresponding economies. As the price cannot be adjusted in each period,
the maximization problem of the pricing unit is not a static but a dynamic
one. Let rpH,t denote the optimally chosen relative domestic price of good z,
rp∗H,t denote the optimally chosen relative foreign price good z, and ΓH,t,t+i
be defined as ΓH,t,t+i ≡
∏i
l=1 γH,t+l, with ΓH,t,t ≡ 1. Then, optimal choices
of the domestic and foreign prices by the pricing unit of firm z imply the
following first order conditions:4
rpH,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓH,t,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
1+η (PH,t+i/Pt)
θ−η Ct+imct+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓH,t,t+i (Pt+i/Pt)
η (PH,t+i/Pt)
θ−η Ct+i
,
(6.20)
rp∗H,t =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓ
∗
H,t,t+i
(
P ∗t+i/P
∗
t
)1+η (
P ∗H,t+i/P
∗
t
)θ−η
C∗t+imct+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 Λt,t+iΓ
∗
H,t,t+i
(
P ∗t+i/P
∗
t
)η (
P ∗H,t+i/P
∗
t
)θ−η
C∗t+irt+i
.
3In equation (6.6), following Danthine and Kurmann (2004), I replaced wt−1(z) with
wt−1.
4By deriving the optimal price equations, I assume that each firm maximizes its value
in the currency of the economy it belongs to.
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(6.21)
Following Rotemberg (2005), the probabilities that a pricing unit of a do-
mestic firm cannot change the prices are given by
log γH,t = ωrp log rpH,t + ωπ log πt−1, (6.22)
and
log γ∗H,t = ωrp log rp
∗
H,t + ωπ log π
∗
t−1, (6.23)
with ωrp > 0 and ωπ < 0.
The law of motion of the technology shock is governed by
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + ǫAt , (6.24)
where ǫAt is a normally distributed mean zero shock. Notice that, in contrast
to the technology shock process assumed in Chapter 4, equation (6.24) does
not feature any spillover effects arising from an innovation in technology in
the foreign country.
6.1.4 The Monetary Authority
The monetary authority of each country finances lump-sum transfers by
newly printed money. For the domestic country this relation is given by∫ 1
0
T jt dj =Mt −Mt−1, (6.25)
where Mt is the money supply which grows at a gross rate of mt, namely
Mt = mtMt−1. (6.26)
The growth rate of money supply follows the following process:
logmt = log π
1−ρm + ρm logmt−1 + ǫmt , (6.27)
where ǫmt is a normally distributed mean zero shock.
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Table 6.1: Calibrated Parameters
Discount factor: β = 1.03−1/4
Semi elasticity of money demand: σm = 10.85
Degree of habit formation:; h = 0.62
Elasticity of real wage w.r.t.
a)employment: η1 ≡ −φ2/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.03
b)past real wage: η2 ≡ −φ4/(φ1 + φ3) = 0.99
Demand elasticity: η = θ = 10
Degree of home bias χH = 0.94
Steady-state value of reset probability: 1− γ = 0.25
Steady-state value of gross inflation: pi = 1.041/4
Elasticity of γt w.r.t.
a)optimal relative price: ωrp = 1.5
b)past inflation: ωπ = −15
Serial correlation of the money growth rate: ρm = 0.60
Serial correlation of the technology process: ρA = 0.96
6.1.5 Solution Method and the Calibration of the Model
As a result of assumed trend inflation in both countries, all nominal vari-
ables other than domestic and foreign nominal interest rates are nonstation-
ary. Accordingly, they are normalized prior to solving the model. I solve the
model by log-linearizing it around a steady state with trend inflation. I then
use the numerical algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001)
to compute the equilibrium dynamics of the calibrated model. Calibration of
the model is mainly the same as in Chapter 3. Parameters absent in Chapter
3 are χH and η.
5 These two parameters are calibrated as in Steinsson (2008).
I set χH = 0.94, a value used also by Chari et al. (2002). I set η = θ = 10
implying a markup rate of 11%. The benchmark calibration of the model is
summarized in Table 6.1.
6.2 Simulation Results
I present impulse response functions in order to analyze the dynamic prop-
erties of my model. I do not present business cycle statistics, i.e., second
moments, mainly because the baseline model above is based on a small-scale
macroeconomic model extended to feature two unorthodox specifications. It
5As χH + χF = 1, the value of χF is implied by the value of χH . Balanced trade
requires χH = χ∗F .
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abstracts from many specifications that are important to account for busi-
ness cycles dynamics of real economies, such as investment, variable capacity
utilization, costly investment/capital adjustment, time-to-build technology,
home production, different real shocks, just to name a few. Including such
specifications, however, makes the model unnecessarily complicated to dis-
entangle the specific roles played by fair price and wage setting mechanisms,
and, thus, to evaluate their importance.6 Moreover, economic intuition one
gains from impulse response functions is to a great extent superior as they
present the direct response to each type of shock (Gali 1999).
I report impulse response functions for the baseline model and for some
of its variants. I opt for two groups of variants of the baseline model. The
first group of variants is chosen in order to highlight and disentangle the joint
implications of the wage and price setting mechanisms used in the baseline
model. To this end, I consider a price setting mechanism formulated by
Calvo (1983), and a Walrasian labor market. The second group of variants
is chosen to examine the robustness of the implications of the baseline model
across its three features: (i)Financial markets completeness, (ii)Description
of monetary policy, and (iii)Real wage rigidity. To this end, I consider a
model featuring incomplete financial markets, a model featuring a Taylor
(1993) type interest rate rule, and a model featuring Blanchard and Gali
(2007) type wage rigidity.
6.2.1 Interaction of Fair Prices and Fair Wages
Implications for a Nominal Shock
Figure 6.1 presents impulse response functions of the baseline model and
its three variants for a domestic monetary shock. The first variant features
Calvo-type price setting, and is obtained by setting γI,t = γ
∗
I,t = γ for I =
H,F and all t. The second variant features a Walrasian labor market, and is
obtained by replacing equation (6.6) of the baseline model with N jt = w
j
tλt.
The third variant features Calvo-type price setting and a Walrasian labor
market. Because I shall refer to these variants repeatedly, I suggest using
the following shorthand: No-fair-prices (No-FP; dashed line) for the first
variant, no-fair-wages (No-FW; dot-dashed line) for the second variant and
no-fair-prices/wages (No-FPW; dotted line) for the third variant.
6In a separate work, I have extended the baseline model of this chapter to feature
investment and investment related specifications. Main results reported in this section
holds there as well.
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Figure 6.1: Impulse Response Functions for a Monetary Shock
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Note: The figure plots the responses of key macroeconomic aggregates to a unit standard
deviation shock to the domestic money growth rate. The horizontal axis measures quarters.
The vertical axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
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The impulse response functions illustrate that qualitative effects of a mon-
etary policy shock on domestic aggregates are the same under baseline model
and its variants. A domestic monetary policy shock gives rise to depreci-
ation of the real exchange rate, which, in turn, makes the current home
consumption cheaper relative to future home consumption. Therefore, home
consumption increases, and, analogously, foreign consumption decreases (See
also the international nominal interest rate differential). But, because con-
sumers have strong preferences for home goods, and because, as a results
of pricing-to-market cum local-currency-pricing strategy of firms, immediate
exchange-rate-pass-through is zero, the responses of foreign aggregates are
quantitatively much smaller than that of domestic aggregates. As a result,
given that prices are sticky, an expansion of domestic money supply triggers
an expansion of aggregate world demand.
Comparing the impulse response functions for the models with different
labor market structures (baseline model versus No-FW model and No-FP
model versus No-FPW) reveals that fair wages amplifies the responses of
domestic country aggregates, and causes reversals in the responses of for-
eign output, foreign inflation, and the foreign real wage rate. The reason for
the amplification is that in the models featuring fair wages, the real wage
rate hardly responds to a monetary expansion, while in the models with a
Walrasian labor market, the biggest impact effect of monetary policy is on
the domestic real wage rate. This implies that the scope of firms for ex-
panding their production to meeting the increase in demand is much larger
in the models featuring fair wage than in the models featuring a Walrasian
labor market. This last point also explains the reversals in the responses of
some foreign variables. In the models featuring a Walrasian labor market,
the substantial initial increase of the domestic real wage rate brings about
the increase in foreign output. Consistently, the foreign real wage rate and,
thus, foreign inflation rise. In the models featuring fair wages, domestic firms
expand their production to fully meet the increase in domestic demand, and
foreign output decreases as foreign demand decreases. The decrease in for-
eign output drives down the foreign real wage rate and, thus, foreign inflation.
In contrast to fair wages, fair price has a dampening effect on the re-
sponses, and does not has a reversal effect. The main reason for this damp-
ening effect is that the inflationary effect of the monetary shock on domestic
country brings about an increase in the frequency of price adjustment be-
cause the customer resistance to price adjustments decreases in past inflation.
With more frequently adjusted prices, we have a higher inflation response.
As a result, the response of output is dampened. Fair prices affect also the
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shape of the inflation response: Only in the models with fair prices, inflation
responds with a delay to a monetary shock, and the delay exceeds by one
quarter the delay in the output response.
The responses of the terms of trade and net exports are consistent to the
response of the real exchange rate. The terms of trade, tott, are defined as
the relative price of domestic imports in terms of domestic exports, namely:
PF,t(StP
∗
H,t)
−1
Net exports, nxt, are defined as the ratio of nominal net exports to nominal
output, namely:(
St
∫ 1
0
c∗t (z)P
∗
t (z)dz −
∫ 2
1
ct(v)Pt(v)dv
)(
Pt
∫ 1
0
yt(z)dz
)−1
The real exchange rate is the main driving force behind the dynamics of
these above defined two variables. The depreciation of the real exchange
rate triggered by a monetary shock improves the terms of trade, to which
net exports positively responds. The response of the real exchange to a
monetary shock does not exhibit a hump shaped pattern, and neither do the
responses of net exports and the terms of trade.
Implications for a Real Shock
Figure 6.2 presents impulse response functions of the baseline model and its
above mentioned three variants for a domestic technology shock. The im-
pulse response functions illustrate that except for the inflation responses in
the models featuring Calvo type price setting, the responses of all variables
display hump shaped patterns. Especially regarding the real exchange rate
dynamics, this is an attractive feature of the baseline model and its variants
given the celebrated Dornbusch (1976) paper and since then growing litera-
ture on the delayed overshooting puzzle.
Specifically, three issues regarding the dynamics of the real exchange rate
is empirically appealing in the baseline model: The persistence of the real
exchange response, the volatility of the real exchange rate, and the delay in
the peak of the real exchange rate response. In the baseline model, all these
measures are higher than the other three variants. This result distinguishes
the combination of the fair-price and fair-wage settings. The intuition behind
this results is as in the case of a monetary shock, and what follows briefly
explains this intuition.
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Figure 6.2: Impulse Response Functions for a Technology Shock
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Note: The figure plots the responses of key macroeconomic aggregates to a unit standard
deviation shock to domestic technology. The horizontal axis measures quarters. The ver-
tical axis measures logarithmic/percentage deviations from the steady state.
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The fair-wage setting has a magnifying effect on the responses of all vari-
ables except the responses of the real wage rates. Note that in the models
featuring the fair-wage setting, the domestic real wage rate reaches its peak
after around three years, and during this three years, many variables revert
to their mean. This implies that the extent to which a technology shock
affect quantities and ratios other then the real wage rate is much higher in
the models featuring the fair-wage setting than in the models with a Wal-
rasian labor market because in the former models the real wage rate adjusts
sluggishly. Furthermore, for the same reason, the fair-wage setting has also
a delay-increasing-effect on the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates.
For a technology shock, fair prices amplifies the most of the responses of
the aggregates. This is in stark contrast to the case of a monetary shock,
but the factor behind this result is the same as for the dampening effect of
fair prices in the case of a monetary shock: A domestic technology shock has
disinflationary effects because with the increase in productivity the supply
curve shifts rightwards, and for a given demand and for a given trend in
prices, the rate of change of prices decreases. This disinflationary effect de-
creases the frequency of price adjustments, which, in turn, leads to a further
decrease in inflation. For this reason, the extent to which firms can expand
their production in response to a technology shock is larger in the models
featuring fair prices than in the models featuring Calvo-type price setting.
Closed versus Open
A striking aspect of what the impulse response functions for the home coun-
try variables (output, consumption, inflation, the real wage rate) illustrate is
that they are qualitatively the same as those calculated in the closed econ-
omy model of Chapter 3. Furthermore, for these macroeconomic aggregates,
quantitative differences between the impulse response functions calculated
in Chapter 3 and those calculated in the present chapter are not significant.
To visualize this point, Figure 6.3 presents the impulse response functions
of both models sharing the same calibration. Only noticeable difference is
that the consumption response for the open economy model to a technology
shock is smoother than that for the closed economy model. But this results
is not surprising as in the open economy model consumers have access to
international asset markets. Thus, the implications of fair prices and fair
wages for the propagation of monetary policy and technology shocks and
the corresponding results that I reported in Chapter 3 do not change under
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the assumptions of the present model that are related to the open economy
setting.
Figure 6.3: Closed Economy versus Open Economy
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Note: Solid (dot-dashed) lines represent the responses to a monetary shock in the open
(closed) economy setup. Dashed (dotted) lines represent the responses to a technology
shock in the open (closed) economy setup.
6.2.2 Financial Markets Completeness, Monetary Pol-
icy Instrument, and Real Wage Rigidity
I now turn to the second group of variants of the baseline model which I
chose to study the robustness of the implications of the baseline model across
its three features: (i)Financial markets completeness, (ii)Monetary policy
instrument, and (iii)Real wage rigidity. Figure 6.4 compares the baseline
model to these variants for a monetary shock (Panel A) and for a technology
shock (Panel B).
Incomplete Financial Markets
Because the complete financial markets structure of the baseline model can
be a too restrictive assumption, I replace it with an incomplete financial
markets one. In this case, the budget constraints of the domestic and foreign
households and the market-clearing condition for the international financial
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market are given by
Djt
Pt
+
M jt
Pt
+ Cjt =
Rt−1D
j
t−1
Pt
+
M jt−1 + T
j
t
Pt
+ wjtN
j
t + Φ
j
t , (6.28)
Dj∗t
StP ∗t
+
F j∗t
P ∗t
+
M j∗t
P ∗t
+Cj∗t =
Rt−1D
j∗
t−1
StP ∗t
+
R∗t−1F
j∗
t−1
P ∗t
+
M j∗t−1 + T
j∗
t
P ∗t
+wj∗t N
j∗
t +Φ
j∗
t .
(6.29)
and ∫
j
Djtdj +
∫
j
Dj∗t dj = 0, (6.30)
where Dt (D
∗
t ) denotes the domestic (foreign) households’ holdings of bonds
denominated in domestic currency, and F ∗t denotes the foreign households’
holdings of bonds denominated in foreign currency. These equations imply
that an international market for foreign currency denominated bonds does
not exist.7 First order conditions with respect to Dt, D
∗
t , and F
∗
t imply, as a
first order approximation, the standard uncovered interest rate parity (UIP)
condition: R˜t = R˜
∗
t +EtS˜t+1− S˜t, where a tilde over variable denotes its log-
deviation from steady state. This standard form of UIP condition, however,
cannot be used as an equilibrium condition since it results in instationarity.
For this reason, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), I add a debt elas-
tic risk premium to the UIP condition. To obtain the model with incomplete
financial markets, I replace the log-linear version of equation (6.11) of the
baseline model with
R˜t = R˜
∗
t + EtS˜t+1 − S˜t −ΨD˜t. (6.31)
The motivating argument for adding the risk premium to the UIP condition
is that to compensate for default risk of a large debt, households require a
higher interest rate. For example, a negative D˜t imply that the domestic
economy has a net debtor position, and therefore the domestic households
should pay higher interest rate on their debts. In contrast, a positive D˜t imply
that the domestic economy is in a net lender position, and therefore foreign
households should pay higher interest rate on their debts. I set Ψ = 0.004,
based on the empirical estimates reported by Bergin (2006).
7An international market for foreign currency denominated bonds can easily be intro-
duced to the model. I refrained from doing so because such a market would be redundant
for equilibrium dynamics of the model.
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Figure 6.4: Impulse Response Functions
Panel A - for a Monetary Shock
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Panel B - for a Technology Shock
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Panel A of Figure 6.4 illustrates that changing the structure of financial
markets as above hardly affects the dynamics of the macroeconomic aggre-
gates in the aftermath of a monetary shock. Incomplete financial markets
specification (dashed line) slightly increases the response of consumption,
and dampens the depreciation of the real exchange rate and the improve-
ment of the terms of trade. The reason for this result is that a restriction
on the trade of international financial assets lessens households’ ability to
smooth consumption by trading in international financial assets. As a result
of the lessened ability to smooth consumption, a monetary shock has larger
effect on consumption and smaller effect on prices of international financial
assets (the real exchange rate). Same arguments hold also for the effects of
a technology shock (responses are shown in Panel B), though the change in
the responses of consumption, the real exchange rate and the terms trade
with respect to the change in the structure of international financial market
is of much larger magnitude for a technology shocks than for the a monetary
shock. The magnitude of change in the response of consumption and the
real exchange rate becomes smaller if one considers Calvo or Walrasian labor
market variants of my model (both not shown).
Taylor Rule
Because Taylor (1993) type interest rate rules can provide a more accurate
description of monetary policy than the one I propose in Subsection 6.1.4, it
will be convenient to contrast the implications of them. To this end, I assume
that the monetary authority conducts its policy according to an interest rate
rule given by
logRt = ρR logRt−1 + (1− ρR) (a log πt + b log yt) + εRt , (6.32)
where εRt is a normally distributed mean zero shock. Based on the estimation
results of Clarida et al. (2000), I set ρ = 0.9, a = 2.15, and b = 0.15.
Panel A of Figure 6.4 illustrates that changing the description of mone-
tary policy has in general small effects on the dynamics of macroeconomic
aggregates in the aftermath of a monetary shock. With an interest rate rule
(dot-dashed line) the inflation response becomes more persistent, and the
impact effect of a monetary policy shock is larger on the all variables. The
reason for the latter is that in the model featuring an interest rate rule, in
the first quarter, international nominal interest rate differential (not shown
in the figure) is 230 basis points while the same statistic is 10 basis points
in the baseline model. Consequently, all other variables’ responses are larger
on impact. A larger impact effect on inflation increases the frequency of
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price adjustment, and in turn, inflation increases further. Once again, same
arguments hold also for the effects of a technology shock, but this time the
international nominal interest rate differential is around 366 basis points in
the model featuring an interest rate rule while its is zero in the baseline
model. For this reason, we observe larger impact effects on the macroeco-
nomic aggregates, which translates itself to a amplified response of inflation.8
For a technology shock, an interesting implication of an interest rate rule is
that the delay in the overshooting of the real exchange rate response is more
pronounced.
An Alternative Real Wage Rigidity
In a recent paper Blanchard and Gali (2007) propose a new wage setting
model to account for the real wage rigidity. Their wage-setting model is
a partial adjustment model that explains the dynamics of the real wage in
terms of an arithmetic average of the lagged real wage and the Walrasian
real wage. Specifically, their wage-setting model is given by
logwt = ρw logwt−1 + (1− ρw) logmrst, (6.33)
where mrst denotes the marginal rate of substitution between labor and
consumption and given by mrst = Nt/λt. The real wage, thus, depends on
the lagged real wage and employment and, in addition, on consumption (cf.
equation 6.4 ). In the baseline model, in contrast, the real wage depends on
the lagged real wage and employment. Recall that in a model featuring a
Walrasian labor market real wage rate depends on employment and consump-
tion. Thus, the model of Blanchard and Gali provides a combination of the
fair-wage setting and Walrasian wage setting. To analyze the implications of
this model, I replaced equation 6.6 of the baseline model with equation 6.33.
Following the calibration of Blanchard and Gali, I set ρw = 0.9.
Panel A of Figure 6.4 illustrates that the model featuring the real wage
rigidity of Blanchard and Gali (dotted line) generates virtually the same re-
sponses to a monetary shock as the baseline model (solid line). Only excep-
tion is the response of the real wage rate which is slightly muted in the former
model. It appears from Panel B of Figure 6.4 that the effect of Blanchard
and Gali consideration is mainly pronounced for the dynamics of exchange
rate and the terms of trade as the responses of the variables are amplified.
The responses of other variables are not affected significantly.
8See Subsection 6.2.1 for a detailed explanation of the propagation of a technology
shock in the baseline model.
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6.3 Conclusions
From the analysis above, it appears that the results I report for the closed
economy model of Chapter 3 do not change under the assumptions that are
related to the open economy setting. Furthermore, even though my model
is relatively small, the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to monetary
and technology shocks match those implied by large scale open economy
macroeconomic models (Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust 2006). Another impor-
tant finding of my analysis is that assuming complete or incomplete asset
markets matters for consumption and the real exchange rate dynamics in
the aftermath of a technology shock. This result contradicts the findings
of previous research, (e.g., Baxter and Crucini 1995, Kollmann 1996, and
Schmitt-Grohe` and Uribe 2003), and does not hold if I remove fair price
and/or fair wage specifications from my model.
This brief summary of my results presents a clear evidence that fair prices
and fair wages have important implications also for open economy macroe-
conomics. Future research can employ other shocks (such as shocks to gov-
ernment spending, preferences, uncovered interest rate parity condition, oil
price) to analyze the implications of fair prices and fair wages. Another
possible extension is that incorporating fair prices and/or fair wages with
endogenously incomplete asset markets to study their joint implications for
international asset prices.
Chapter 7
Outlook on Future Research
What must be the general conclusion from the analyses I have undertaken in
this dissertation? My results suggest that fair wages and fair prices may have
profound and far-reaching implications. In Chapter 2, I have extended the
model of Rotemberg (2005) such that the extended model implies a positive
relationship between the nominal interest rate and the frequency of price ad-
justment, and this implication stems from the supply side effects of monetary
policy. The extended model can account both for the persistence of the out-
put response and for the muted and delayed inflation response to monetary
policy shocks. In Chapter 3, I have shown that incorporating fair prices and
fair wages can explain the dynamic relationship between output and infla-
tion we observe in data. Further, in the aftermath of monetary policy shock,
In Chapters 4 and 5, I have added fair wages to an otherwise standard two-
country (New Keynesian) model to account for the stylized facts of real-world
labor markets. My analysis induces that international trade in financial as-
sets is unlikely to give rise to a significant increase in labor market volatility.
Further, my results suggest that financial market integration should increase
the output effect of fiscal policy. This last point contradicts the result derived
from the textbook version of the Mundell (1963)-Fleming (1962) model. In
Chapter 6, I have shown that extending the closed economy model of Chap-
ter 3 to allow for open economy related dynamics does not bring about a
significant difference in the dynamics of the key aggregates. I have shown
that the model is capable of generating delayed exchange rate overshooting
in the aftermath of a technology shock. I have also found that consumption
and the real exchange rate dynamics significantly change by restricting the
households’ access to international asset markets. This results contradicts
the findings of previous research (Baxter and Crucini 1995, Kollmann 1996,
and Schmitt-Grohe` and Uribe 2003).
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Each of these results is self evidently important. But much more research
should be conducted before a conclusive policy advice can be drawn. The
reason for this is that as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001, p.295) remark:
. . . Hippocrates advised the doctor to do no harm. This minimal
advice is equally important to the central banker. In particular,
a necessary condition for good monetary policy is that it does not
introduce sunspot fluctuations into the real economy. . . . Hence, a
central conclusion . . . is that we need to think much more carefully
about basic modeling assumptions when writing down monetary
models. A lot depends on apparently trivial assumptions.
Besides we do not have fully-fledged microeconomic foundations of fair-
ness concerns as we do not have fully-fledged microeconomic foundations of
nominal-price and labor-market rigidities. Therefore, a potentially promising
path for future research appears to be microeconomics of fairness concerns.
Rabin (1993), Rotemberg (2004), and Yengin (2007) are important advances
in this direction.
In future research, my analysis could be extended to explore the im-
plications of other forms of market imperfectness and incompleteness. For
example, incorporating fairness concerns with search models of labor market
(Mortensen and Pisarides 1994) and models with endogenously incomplete
international financial markets (Kehoe and Perri 2002) can have important
implications for the dynamics of the macroeconomic aggregates.
I have used a two-country framework to analyze issues specific to interna-
tional economics. For small industrial economies a more relevant framework
may be a small open economy model such as the one developed by Gali and
Monacelli (2005). It would be interesting to analyze how fair prices and
fair wages interact with features that are specific to small open economies.
Another interesting subject for future research is the welfare evaluation of
alternative policy regimes under households’ and workers’ fairness concerns.
We have started the dissertation with a quotation. We can finish with
another one that may shed light on our discussion of fluctuations.
. . .As long as the roots are not severed, all is well and all will be well in
the garden.
. . . In a garden, growth has its season. There is spring and summer, but
there is also fall and winter. And then spring and summer again.
. . .There will be growth in the spring.
Chance the Gardener1
1Peter Sellers character from the movie Being There.
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